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curriculum at Cornell which provides instruction by specialis�s in 
Southeast Asian cultural history and present-day affairs and offers 
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the area. At the same time, individual staff and students of the 
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the end of this volume. Infonnation on Program staff, fe.llowships., 
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The events that have occurred in what was Cambodia, and especially since June 
1975, now seem to be in the process of transforming that land, in the eyes of the 
outside world, into another "land of mystery" not unlike that which French explorers 
claimed to be unshrouding when they "discovered" the ruins of Angkor hidden beneath 
the jungle. The "mystery" of contemporary Kampuchea, however, is but the product 
of our own ignorance, which this Data Paper is intended to help dispel. 
The Southeast Asia Program has over the years been fortunate in attracting a 
small stream of U.S. Foreign Service Officers with Southeast Asian expertise and 
experience who have come for a year's study-leave in order to broaden and deepen 
their knowledge. Tim Carney is the most recent of these, a veteran of three years' 
service with the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh who.ehas a high degree of proficiency in 
the Khmer language, a commitment to scholarly discourse, and a determination to make 
sense of the momentous events through which he lived. Read against the background
of those events, this volume does much to illuminate our understanding of the current 
leadership of the government of Kampuchea, its policies, and its roots in Cambodia's 
troubled past. 





A Department of State assignment to Cornell for a year of Southeast Asian area 
studies gave me the time to research for this paper. Professor David K. Wyatt's 
course in modern Southeast Asian history provided the academic structure in which I 
researched and wrote. Professors Wyatt and Benedict R. O'G. Anderson criticized 
earlier drafts of the paper. I am also grateful to Mr. Stephen Heder, Dr. David 
Elliott and Mr. Paul McNellis for suggesting additional sources, comparative examples 
and helpful comment in general. My colleagues Jack Pavoni of the Department of State 
and Barry Broman at the American Embassy in Bangkok helped track down and clarify 
valuable sources. Mr. Im Proum deserves special thanks for reviewing my transla­
tions. His calligraphy graces the Glossary. 
Khmer terms and proper nouns in the Introduction and in the translations appear 
in their standard French spellings. For accurate transliterations I have used a sys­
tem which Professor Franklin Huffman devised based on Sanskrit. An approximately 
phonetic romanization accompanies most of these often tortuous transliterations. 
The first two translations come from the handwritten, mimeographed Khmer Commu­
nist Youth Alliance monthly for August 1973. The first article, "Manifesto of the 
Periodical Revolutionary Yotmg Men and Women," sets forth the aims of the publica­
tion. The second article gives the party's view of youth problems and the party's 
role in awakening youth consciousness. A unit of the Khmer Republic's army seized 
the periodical in Kompong Chhnang province in late 1973. 
Ith Sarin, an Inspector of Primary Education who spent most of 1972 in the 
bush as a candidate party member,wrote the third and fourth items; One is a trans­
lation from the French version of his request to rally' to the Khmer Republic; the 
other is my translation of the last half of his book, Regrets for the Khmer Soul, 
published in Khmer in Phnom Penh in late 1973. 
The last translation comes from captured handwritten notes entitled "A Short 
Guide for Application of Party Statutes." Republican forces seized it in fighting
around Phnom Penh in February 1975. I have not examined the Khmer original. 
. . 
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CONTINUITY IN CAMBODIAN COMMUNISM 
by Timothy Michael Carney 
Introduction 
Neither official Cambodian public documents nor Radio Phnom Penh mention the 
existence much less name the leadership of a communist party in Cambodia. Neverthe­
less, a varied but limited number of sources confirm the party's existence and Lenin­
ist role in the revolution and sketch party ideology and programs. Elements of that 
ideology have emerged at an accelerating rate in Radio Phnom Penh's post-victory 
broadcasts. Parts of the ideology and programs have roots in earlier writings of 
both Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim. Foreign Communist publications since 1970 cast addi­
tional light on the party and underscore lists of its leadership provided by defec­
tors. 
This paper relies heavily on the report and book Ith Sarin wrote after spending 
most of 1972 as a candidate party member in the bush.e1 Of the documents used which 
emanate from the party itself, an article in the party youth alliance monthly,e2 sets 
forth class analysis and confirms the party'es leading role in the revolutio"n. Recent 
Phnom Penh radio broadcasts strongly support the accuracy of material from both of 
these sources. Khieu Samphan's newspaper, L'Observateur, his doctoral thesis and 
that of Hu Nim give evidence for the roots of party ideology and programs and com­
plete the list of major primary sources. I have also, of course, drawn on my tour 
in Cambodia from 1972 to 1975 with the U.S. Embassy. 
Available sources on Khmer radicalism do not match those ori the Vietnamese or 
even the Lao in either quality or quantity, and leave many key questions open. "The 
material on the period of the First Indochina War inadequately approaches the ori­
gins of Khmer communism and its ties to the Vietnamese. For the post-Geneva era, 
untouched topics include the relations among the Khmer who went to North Vietnam for 
training, those who stayed in the bush, and those who emerged as the leftist legal 
opposition. The last eventually gave the movement three prominent leaders in the 
early 1960s: Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim. The period from 1967, when these 
three men disappeared into the_ bush, to 1970 also needs serious work, perhaps start­
ing with interviews of surviving Khmer political figures. 
1 Ith Sarin, Srar:aoh Pralung Khmer [Regrets for the Khmer Soul] (Phnom Penh, 
1973), and "Nine Months with the Maquis" (Translated by U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh, 
May 1973). Both book and report draw on Ith Sarin's observations and those of a com­
panion who did not publish. The book's stated purpose is to awaken Khmer Republican 
leftists to the dangers the Khmer communists pose and cause them to end opposition 
to the regime. The paper served as Ith Sarin's request to rally and includes some 
frank suggestions for Republican reform. I will cite the book hereafter as SPK. 
211Paks kommunis karnpuchea nung panaha yuvachun nungeyuvaneari kampuchea [The 
Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Problem of Young Men and Women of Kampuchea]," 
Yuvaahun nung yuvaneari padavat [Revolutionary Young Men and Women], l (August 1973). 
This handwritten mimeographed periodical carries the legend, "Informational and Edu­





Cambodian communism has its roots in the Viet Minh-oriented wing of the anti­
French Khmer Issarak independence movement.e3 A number of published sources since 
1970 point to 1951 as the founding year of a Cambodian party. Wilfred Burchett set 
1951 as the year the "Pracheachon" or People's party formed. He called the Prachea­
chon "in fact the Cambodian Communist Party, formed after the dissolution of the 
Indochinese Communist Party in 1951 and the constitution of communist parties in 
each of the three states.e114 A year after Sihanouk'es overthrow the then-clandestine 
Radio in a May Day broadcast noted that "After World War II and particularly after 
1951, the Cambodian working class . . .  continued to develop and strengthen.e115 Ieng 
Sary subsequently cited 1951 as the year when "we began following the criminal activ­
ities of American imperialism and its Cambodian puppets.e116 Finally, the party itself 
dates its founding to 1951 as the Pracheachon party which only in Seftember 1966 took 
the name Communist Party of Kampuchea (PKK--Pak Kornmunis Kampuchea). That 1951 
creation had called itself the "Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party"; its statutes 
copied those of North Vietnam's Lao Dong party, and its Secretary-General, Sieu Heng, 
had worked closely with the Viet Minh.e8 
Working with the Vietnamese posed certain problems for the Khmer with reper­
cussions that have lasted even until today. In the mid and late 1940s the only going 
national concerns in mainland Southeast Asia held power in Hanoi and Bangkok. The 
early Khmer independence leaders had dismissed Sihanouk as a French lackey, a view 
also congenial to the republican ideals of a small number of the elite. Pridi's 
Free Thai government in Bangkok gave massive assistance to the Khmer Issarak in 1946 
and 1947, partly for ideological reasons and partly to discomfit the French who, by 
late 1946, had succeeded in wresting back Thai wartime territorial gains in Laos and 
3The Khmer Issarak originally started in Bangkok in the early 1940s with Thai 
sponsorship that reached its height under Pridi's 1946-47 government. The November 
1947 Thai rightist coup ended strong support and the Issarak entered an uneasy alli­
ance with the Viet Minh which lasted until January 1949 when Dap Chuon, who figured 
in the original Issarak exile government announced in Bangkok in 1947, dropped out 
of the Viet Minh-assisted Committee of Khmer Liberation. Within a year the Viet Minh 
had turned to Nguyen Thanh Son, Sieu Heng and Son Ngoc Minh, whose made-up name 
attempted to capitalize on a nonexistent relationship to popular nationalist Son 
Ngoc Thanh. Son Ngoc Thanh's Thai-supported dissidence from 1952 after his return 
from exile forms another story. See Khmer Peace Committee, KhTner AT'f11ed Resistance 
(October 1959); Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast 
Asia (Stanford, 1955), pp. 173-178; David Steinberg et al.e, Cambodia (New Haven, 
1959), pp. 106-112; Charles Meyer, Derriere le sourire khmer (Paris, 1971), p. 186; 
and V. M. Reddi, A History of the Cambodian Independence Movement: 1863-1955 (Tiru­
pati, India, 1970?). 
4Wilfred G. Burchett, The Second Indochina War (New York, 1970), p. 51. 
5u.s. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, No. 86 (March 4, 
1971), reporting Agence Khmere d'eInformation's "1st of May, Glorious International 
Labor Day." Hereafter cited FBIS. 
6Le Monde (Paris), January 15, 1972, carrying an interview of Ieng Sary by 
Claude Julien. 
71th Sarin, "Nine Months,e" p. 5. See also "A Short Guide for Application of 
Party Statutes" (Translated captured document), Phnom Penh, 1975, for mention of a 
September 1966eCentral Committee decision to change the party's name. 
8Charles Meyer, Derriere le sourire khmer, p. 186. He cites Maurice Laurent, 
L'Armee au Cambodge et dans Zes pays en voie de developpement du Sud-Est Asiatique 
(Paris, 1968), 43. 
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Cambodia. The Thai rightist coup of November 1947 ended major Thai aid to the Khmer 
Issarak, whose -Bangkok-based government the Thai had only just formally recognized, 
and left the Viet Minh as the only support for Khmer who wished to continue the fight 
for real independence. Khmer memories of the period during the early 19th century 
when Nguyen Vietnam tried to incorporate and Vietnamize Cambodia and resentment over 
French use of Vietnamese personnel in the lower colonial service remained strongly 
alive, however, among both peasants and elite. This hostility emerged when Sihanouk 
genuinely appeared to be working for real independence. Issarak leaders mistrustful' 
of ultimate Vietnamese intentions actively rallied to .  the Prince or simply ended dis­
sidence. Major Khmer leaders from this period do not figure in today's Cambodian 
"revolutionary organization" and the Khmer who opted to go to North Vietnam under the 
terms of the Geneva Accords apparently met with increasing ingratitude after their 
1970 return to staff the expanding revolutionary movement.e9 
The rechristened "Democratic Kampuchea" has publicly underscored the new state's 
symbolic connection with the Issarak period. The S January 1976 Constitution speci­
fies that the new national flag shows three yellow towers on a red field. The Viet 
Minh-oriented segment of the Issarak displayed a flag identical except for showing 
five rather than three of Angkor Wat's towers.e10 
.Sihanouk's success in gaining full independence from the French in 1953 and 
Issarak exclusion from the 1954 Geneva Conference forced a change in tactics. Hou 
Yuon told party intellectuals that the party had bowed to the pressure of socialist 
countries at Geneva and ended the fighting.e11 The period from 1954 to 1967, there­
fore, became the "era of political struggle,e" a time of open and clandestine educa­
tional efforts to rouse and develop public awareness of national and class problems.e12 
In internal politics, the Pracheachon Group emerged as a party to contest the 1955 
and 1958 National Assembly elections. By 1962, however, Sihanouk had forced the 
Pracheachon underground.e13 From the latter part of this period, the party repeatedly 
sent intellectuals to the maquis to form combat cells. From 1967 the party regarded 
the armed struggle as having resumed and claimed to have prepared the March 1967 
peasant uprising at Samlaut, Battambang province (see below), in advance.e14 
9FBIS, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, IV, No. 3 (April 4, 1974) carries Agence 
France Presse in English from Hong Kong of 1 April 1974 entitled "Defectors Recount 
Disaffection with Communists.e" Two defectors told AFP that they had returned after 
training in North Vietnam to engage in military training and village organization. 
Hereafter cited as FBIS-APA. 
10The two-color frontispiece to the pamphlet by the Khmer Peace Committee, 
Khmer AT'/7/ed Resistance (October 1952), shows the Viet Minh-oriented wing of the Khmer 
Issarak's national flag. 
11 1th Sarin, "Nine Months,e" p. 6, quoting Hou Yuon during a 26 May 1972 
speech. 
1 2 y-yp p . 1 7 • , 
13Mission du Front Uni National du Kampuchea (Paris), Bulletin d'Information 
(August 11, 1972), carries an item from Agence Khmere d'Information translating a 
statement from the Committee of the Pracheachon Group denouncing the creation of a 
false Pracheachon party to contest the Khmer Republic's 1972 legislative elections. 
The statement affirms that the real Pracheachon ended activities in 1962 due to re­
pression which had also involved progressive and patriotic Khmer not affiliated with 
the Pracheachon. 
14 1th Sarin, "Nine Months,e" p. 6. 
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The Party Emerges 
In the five years of war after Sihanouk's deposition in 1970, a number of signs 
pointed to the existence of a communist party in Cambodia and supported Ith Sarin'es 
and other defectors' claims about the party leadership. Wilfred Burchett remarked 
on the 1963 disappearance of Son Sen, Director of the Normal School in Phnom Penh, 
and two teachers, Ieng Sary and Salot Sar. Their wives, he incorrectly noted, dis­
sppeared a year later.e15 Ieng Sary and his wife, Khieu Thirith, reappeared in Siha­
nouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) in 1970 as Special Representative 
from the Interior and Vice-M:i!nister for Education and Youth, respectively. After 
Sihanouk's brief 1973 foray into Cambodia, China Pietorial's photo supplement on the 
visit depicted Son Sen among the greeters, identified as Chief of the General Staff 
of the People's Armed Forces of National Liberation of Cambodia (CPNLAF). The maga­
zine also pictured the enigmatic Salot Sar, with no title; and the photo of his wife, 
Khieu Ponnary, who is Khieu Thirith's sister, carried the caption, "Chairman of the 
Democratic Women's League.e1116 
In 1974 the Chinese formally, but not specifically, demonstrated that the Khmer 
fit into the category of friendly communist parties. In February Khieu Samphan set 
out on major travels in the Asian communist world, parts of Eastern Europe, and 
Africa. His Peking reception evidenced a strong Chinese desire to give him interna­
tional face. On his initial arrival and subsequent comings and goings through Peking, 
Keng Piao, listed among "responsible persons departments concerned," welcomed him. 
Keng Piao holds the title "Director of the International Liaison Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.e1117 His presence more prominently 
marked Ieng Sary's November/December visit as head of a financial delegation. New 
China News Agency listed Keng Piao as the second-ranking greeter.e18 The next day 
Keng Piao and his Deputy Director, Sen Chien, attended, with others, talks between 
the Khmer visitors and Chinese leaders. Both liaison officials enjoyed the banquet 
following the talks, reinforcing this indication that the Khmer count among "frater­
nal" parties. Keng Piao's published appearances in 1974 show nine meetings with 
different communist party delegations or chairmen; two with youth organizations, one 
from Romania and the other from Syria; and a meeting with a women's delegation from 
Albania.e19 
The Khmer have yet, however, openly to engage in the sort of rhetoric with fra­
ternal parties that characterizes, for example, the public Lao Dong-Pathet Lao rela­
tionship.e20 Khmer rhetoric on the occasion of Mao'es death did imply the existence 
of a party in Cambodia by noting that the Khmer joined in the mourning with the 
15Burchett, Seeond Indochina War, p. 53 claims the ladies followed their hus­
bands a year after the men disappeared. Mme. Salot Sar, however, actually remained 
in Phnom Penh until September 1965. She appears on the staff of the English edition 
of Sihanouk's magazine Kambuja for its first two issues in the summer of 1965 which 
shows she did not suffer for her husband's defection. 
16China Pictorial, Supplement to No. 6, 1973. 
17U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Reference Aid: Directory of Officials of 
the People's Republic of China (Washington, April 1975). 
18 FBIS, Daily Report: People's Republic of China, I, No. 2 14 (November 5, 1974). 
19U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, Reference Aid: Appearanae and Aativities 
of Leading Personalities of the People's Republic of China 1 Jan.-31 Dee. 1974 
(Washington, March 1975). 
20New York Times, February 12, 1976 carries an AFP resume of a Lao Radio report 
on the visit of Lao government and party leaders to Hanoi noting the aim to "streng­
then relations between the two parties and countries.e" 
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"fraternal Chinese Communist Party, government and peop.le.1121 Their usual formula 
response to greetings from the Chinese party and people is a reply from the Cambodian 
government and people. 
The Lao apparently have not quite got the message: the Secretary-General of 
the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, who also holds the Prime Ministry, sent a con­
gratulatory telegram to the new Cambodian premier in April 1976 addressed to Pol Pot, 
"Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.e1122 
The Lao had earlier·broadcast the text of congratulations from the Cambodian Communist 
Party Central Committee to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee on 
the 30th anniversary of the Lao proclamation of independence.22a 
Leadership Role 
The party defines its role in Leninist terms. By 1973 the party wrote that it 
had led "through every phase of the national and popular struggle.1123 A year earlier 
Ith Sarin attended the twenty-first anniversary of the founding of the party and de­
scribed a number of banners carrying slogans which highlighted the party's leadership
of the revolution: for example, "Only the Communist Party of Kampuchea can lead the 
revolution to definitive victory.e1124 More recently, Radio Phnom Penh echoed this 
slogan in a historical analysis which put the Cambodian nation and people under the 
"revolutionary organization's correct leadership" even before Sihanouk's overthrow. 25 
The party uses the term "revolutionary organization" or simply the "Organiza­
tion (Angkar)" as its cover name to hide the reality of party control over the revolu­
tion.26 The earliest broadcast use of the term dates to March 1971.e27 Only in Sep­
tember 1976 did the Organization publicly espouse Marxism-Leninism as its ideology.e28 
A month later, Thai insurgent radio cited a Cambodian newspaper which gave the found­
ing date of the Cambodian Revolutionary Organization as 30 September 1951, exactly the 
same date Ith Sarin provided for the founding of the Cambodian Communist Party.28a 
A May Day 1971 broadcast from the then-clandestine radio publicly proclaimed 
the vanguard role of the Cambodian working class: "In Cambodia's history of struggle 
. . e. Cambodian workers and peasants constituted a basic force in which Cambodian 
21FBIS-APA, IV, No. 177 (September 10, 1976) carrying an order for flags to 
fly at half-mast. 
22FBIS-APA, IV, No. 76 (April 19, 1976). This message raises some as yet un­
answerable questions about Salot Sar. He has been identified as the PKK Secretary­
General. The item suggests that Pol Pot is an alias. 
22aFBIS-APA, IV, No. 201 (October 16, 1975). 
Sarin, SPK, p. 69. 2 3 Y-yp, p . 7 • 
Sarin, SPK, p. 56.25FBIS-APA, IV, No. 63 (March 31, 1976) 
27FBIS-APA, IV, No. 54 (March 19, 1971) carries a Voice of the NUFK Khmer­
language statement on the anniversary of Sihanouk's deposition. The FBIS translation 
reads, "All the people are closely united under the leadership of revolutionary or­
ganizations.e" Khmer nouns do not have a plural form, however, and "organization" 
fits the context. 
28FBIS-APA, IV, No. 183 (September 20, 1976). Eulogizing Mao, the Khmer PM 
says, "The Cambodian Revolutionary Organization and the Chinese Communist Party and 




28aFBIS-APA, IV, No. 210 (October 29, 1976) carries the translation from the 
clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand. 
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workers were always the most advanced, most valiant, and most active vanguard.e1129 
The party views itself as "the party of the workers and representative of the inter­
ests of the people and representative of the interests of the nation and youth.e1130 
In Cambodia a limited picture of the people who exercise party leadership can 
be built up drawing heavily on Ith Sarin's observations and those of his companion, 
supplemented from time to time by those of other defectors.e31 Admitting that he did 
not know the complete membership of the party central committee, Ith Sarin listed the 
top dozen. Salot Sar aside, most have figured in Phnom Penh radio broadcasts since 
the April 1975 Khmer Rouge victory with the notable exception of Hou Yuon, whom the 
radio has not mentioned in over a year. The list, with titles current to the 14 April 
1976 announcement of a new government includes: 
Salot Sar, Secretary General of the PKK Central Committee; 
Ieng Sary, second-ranking party figure; made Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in August 1975; 
Khieu Samphan, Chairman of the State Presidium, former Deputy Prime Minister 
and Commander-in-Chief of the CPNLAF; 
Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister charged with National Defense from August 1975, 
Chief of Staff of the Cambodian Revolutionary Army; 
Koy Thuon, former minister of National Economy, Finance and Commerce; Chairman 
of the Northern Region (see below); 
Hu Nim, Minister of Information; 
Tiv 01, former Deputy Minister of Information and Propaganda; 
Hou Yuan, former Minister of the Interior, Communal Reforms and Cooperatives; 
Mrs. Khieu Ponnary, Vice-President of the Phnom Penh Committee of the National 
United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) and Chairman of the Association of Demo­
cratic Women; 
Chou Chet, former Minister of Religious and Social Affairs, Chairman of the 
Southwest Region; 
Sok Thuok, Deputy Minister of National Security, Chairman of the Phnom Penh 
Special Region; 
Poe Doeuskomar, former Deputy Foreign Minister, not included in the full RGNU 
cabinet of January 1975 nor featured since. 
The party apparently seeks a genuinely faceless leadership. Only four of the 
above dozen figure in the April 1976 government, unless others do so under aliases. 
Part of this secrecy probably comes from a desire to avoid a cult of personality and 
certainly ties in with a stated objective to institute collective leadership. Khieu 
Samphan's radio analysis of the new Constitution emphasized that the decision to 
create a three-man State Presidium flowed from the principle of collectivism in all 
fields, with the additional aim of avoiding mistakes. "A collective leadership is 
less prone to make mistakes,e" he said.e32 Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Son Sen lived 
in France during the initial period of de-Stalinization and emphasis on collective 
leadership after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress and we·might expect thate· 
the grudging reception the French Communist Party (PCF) leadership gave to the cam­
paign would have affected these young Cambodians. They most likely saw that this 
French communist reluctance stemmed from its own cult of the personality of PCF 
leader Maurice Thorez, and they surely marked the criticism of Thorez by a dissident 
wing of PCF leadership. Khieu Samphan's explanation subsumes the danger from the 
evils of one-man rule in the observation that collective leadership can avoid 
29FBIS, Daily Report, No. 86 (May 4, 1971). 3 o Y -YP, p . 16 . 
31The defectors whom AFP interviewed in March 1974 confirmed that Salot Sar 
held the job of party secretary-general. 
32FBIS-APA, IV, No. 3 (January 6, 1976). 
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"mistakes.e" Those who stayed in Cambodia could look to Sihanouk to confirm suspi­
cions about the value of one-man rule. 
While the party as an organization has links directly back to the Viet Minh­
oriented section of the Khmer Issarak, most of its identifiable present leadership 
apparently does not. The core of today's leadership studied in France in the late 
40s and SOs and was in its 'teens at the time of the First Indochina War, too young 
for leadership roles.e33 Although several thousand Khmer withdrew to North Vietnam 
in 1954, none appear on lists of the current leadership. Some personalities who 
stayed in the bush or joined the legal opposition to Sihanouk fought against the 
Khmer Republic. The Phnom Penh vernacular press reported that Keav Keo Mony, a for­
mer Issarak Minister, commanded troops in the Battambang region in 1972.e34 An equally 
interesting figure,·eNon Suon, led Sector forces south of Phnom Penh. He served the 
Issarak as a regional official and negotiator and became spokesman for the Pracheachon 
Group until jailed for treason. He spent most of the 60s in prison and ran to the 
bush after Lon Nol released him in 1970. Neither of these two men's names are in 
lists of officials of Democratic Kampuchea. A secondhand report has it that the new 
Prime Minister, Pol Pot, "joined the resi'stance many years ago . . .  to fight the 
Japanese, French and the Americans.1135 Other Issarak leaders, including Sieu Heng, 
lived in retirement under Sihanouk and Lon Nol. 
North Vietnam-trained Khmer did not reach high leadership positions after 1970 
apparently because they became increasingly suspect as the Khmer Rouge local organi­
.zation grew. The number of "Hanoi-Khmer" or those who went north in 1954 varies from 
2,500 to 4,000 men. The North Vietnamese told Sihanouk that 8,000 Khmer had gone 
south to support his return.e36 This figure may reflect additional men who continu­
ally filtered north during Sihanouk's rule. On their return, these troops commanded 
battalions and undertook political and military training of n_ew recruits. By the 
end of 1973, however, serious tensions between the Hanoi-trained group and the local 
organization had developed. Two "Hanoi-Khmer" defectors claimed that the Khmer Rouge 
"liquidated" some of their colleagues and removed others from their functions. When 
the Khmer Rouge disarmed the two men they decided to flee.37 
Events in 1973 evidently led the Cambodian organization to see the "Hanoi­
Khmer" as the thin edge of the Vietnamese wedge. Hou Yuon had told an Intellectuals' 
meeting even in 1972 that the PKK "has foreseen all in preparing for danger from the 
33 reng Sary claims that Khieu Samphan participated in the anti-French activi­
ties of students beginning in 1946. See Le Courrier du Viet Nam (Hanoi), No. 358 
(January 31, 1972). 
34Nokor Thom, November 26, 1972. 
35The Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1976, carries an article by Edith 
Lenart entitled "Leaders from the Ranks" in which she reports that Thiounn Prasit, 
brother of Minister of Health Thiounn Thioeunn, told staffers of the Khmer Paris Mis­
sion that Pol Pot had fought in the resistance from Japanese times, adding that he 
was born along the Khmer-VN border and worked on a rubber plantation near Memot. 
Ms. Lenart also wrote that Nuon Chea, now head of the Standing Committee of the 
Assembly of Representatives of the People of Kampuchea, also served in the Khmer 
Issarak. If confirmed, this information will provide elements of a continuity of 
leadership now lacking in the history of Khmer communism. 
36This information comes from Ker Chhieng, a memb�r of Sihanouk's private of­
fice who defected to Phnom Penh in January 1973 and described his time in Peking and 
travels with Sihanouk to Hanoi to a 29 January 1973 press conference which I attended. 
37FBIS-APA, IV, No. 3 (April 4, 1974), carrying the AFP interview described 
above. 
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VC/NVA (Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army).e1138 Significant Khmer Rouge-NVA friction 
marked the entire year 1973. Armed clashes over supplies and North Vietnamese free­
dom of movement in general reflected growing Khmer Rouge self-confidence with a cor­
ollary armed expression of traditional hostility toward all Vietnamese and those 
associated with them. 
Organization and Recruitment 
A desperate shortage of trained medium and lower level party workers and the 
constraints of working within the framework of the heavily pro-Sihanouk Front inhib­
ited and shaped party organization and recruitment. Ieng Sary set out the goal of 
recruitment in early 1972: 
In  order for the revolution to triumph, it is indispensable that at 
each echelon there be a leadership core composed of men who are firm 
on principles and who know how to apply our political line in con­
crete national conditions creatively and with precise aims.e39 
Later in the year Hou Yuon admitted to assembled intellectuals that the party lacked 
qualified cadre.e4 ° Full party membership took two or three years of candidacy, and 
a long period of education and training preceded the assumption of responsibility.41 
Actually, the demands of their rapidly expanding control caused the party to accel­
erate stages of membership. Ith Sarin said he and his companion were in accelerated, 
advanced stages of candidacy.e42 
The Khmer Rouge instituted collective leadership through committees for their 
territorial administrative units.e43 Party control over these committees took some 
time to solidify and never reached the lowest levels. Orders flowed from the Kena 
Mocchim, the party Central Committee, to the Region (Phiek); then the Sector (Damban), 
the District (Srok); the Khum (township) and finally to the Phum (hamlet, but often 
translated as village). The committee included a chairman, a deputy chairman, and 
members for functional tasks: military, economic, security, political, cultural, 
etc. Members were democratically elected. 
Ith Sarin reports that this structure had not fully formed, even in his time, 
and notes that until mid-1971 Sihanoukists held most of the important jobs in the 
lower organization of some Phum, Khum, District and Sector committees. The North 
Vietnamese had picked those members and they "generally lacked political education. "  
Party members at that time exclusively made up the Region committees and some Sector 
committees. When Ith Sarin made his observations in 1972, some chairmen or committee 
members at the Phum and Khum level still remained in the framework of the Front; that 
is, "they still believed they were making the revolution simply to hand authority 
back to Sihanouk." The party ensured control, Ith Sarin added, by assigning a party 
political commissar to monitor the activities of the entire committee for the Khum, 
District and Sector, thus indicating the key role these intermediate units must have 
38 Ith Sarin, "Nine Months,e" p. 9. 39Le Monde (Paris), January 15, 1972. 
40 Ith Sarin, SPK, p. 62. 41 Ith Sarin, SPK, pp. 62 and 73. 
42My interview with him in Phnom Penh, June 1973. 
43Ieng Sary in Le Monde (Paris), January 15, 1972, described such committees 
as NUFK organs. Ith Sarin, SPK, pp. 71-74, gives details on party control over them. 
Both agree on the membership composition of committees. Refugees from northwest Cam­
bodia note that the authorities now use the term "Sangkat" in place of Khum. 
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played in production, mili tary recruitment and population control . Radio Phnom Penh 
confirmed the outlines of this description of the administrative structure in a March 
1976 broadcast which reported that the "Comrade Committee Chairman of the Siem Reap
Oddar Meanchey Sector" received a delegation of foreign diplomats.e4 4  
The party inadequately controlled the vital military command structure at least 
as late as the end of 1973.4 5  In  theory, the party assigned political commissars to 
assist commanders from company level through Region level.e46 Phouk Chhay, for exam­
ple, held the post in the Southwest Region as well as representing youths, students, 
and pupils on the Phnom Penh NUFK committee. Insurgent military units· in the North­
west, however, sent delegations to·the capital and met with opposition Khmer Republi­
can dignitaries and, late in 1973 even, briefly and inconclusively, with Americans. 
By 1975, the best troops crune from the Northern and the Eastern Regions. They 
entered Phnom Penh after having first smashed Republican control of the Mekong River. 
The Northern Region included Preah Vihear, Stung Treng, Mondulkiri, and Ratanakiri 
provinces under the direct administration of the Central Committee. The Eastern 
Region united Kratie, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and Kompong Cham Provinces.e4 7  Both 
regions abut Vietnam and/or Laos and the party enjoyed the NVA shield during the 
crucial period of Khmer Rouge expansion from 1970 to 1972. Party discipline and 
control, accordingly, should have been more complete over troops from these two 
areas. 
Even in 1975, the largest area, the Southwest Region, apparently had not recov­
ered from losses of troops and cadre during the 1973 fighting. That area included 
Kampot, Koh Kong, Kompong Seila, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang, Kompong Speu, Oudong, and 
Kanda! provides along with Kompong Som port. Troops from this Region suffered 
1n 1973 when they attacked Phnom Penh in the teeth of tactically employed B-52 and 
44FBIS-APA, IV, No. 44 (March 4, 1976). 
45 In  January 1972 Ieng Sary told Le Courrier du Viet Nam that the Cambodian 
Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces were divided into "guerilleros, regional troops, 
and regular troops,e" all under the command of a National Military Committee seconded 
by a Staff. He also noted that regular troops were organized in regiments and re­
gional troops in battalions. By late 1974 the Khmer Rouge had organized their regu­
lar forces into divisions. 
In March 1972 Peking's New China News Agency (FBIS-APA, IV, 59, March 24, 1972) 
reported that, on Khieu Samphan' s proposal, the NUFK Politburo drafted a Decree in­
stituting the High Command of the CPNLAF with Khieu Samphan as President; Salot Sar 
as Vice-President and Chief of the Military Directorate of the Army; Nuon Chea as 
Vice-President and Chief of the Poli ti cal Dire.ctora.te of the Army; So Vanna as Vice­
President and Deputy Chief of the Army Military Directorate; Thieun Chhith as Member 
and Chief of the Directorate of Military Materiel, Son Sen as Member and Chief of 
the General Staff.e. The NUFK Paris Mission published the text of the Decree in its 
Bulletin d'Information of March 31, 1972 and I have based the titles of High Command 
officials on the French rather than the FBIS report of Hsinhua' s English-language 
broadcaste. 
46I th Sarin, "Nine Months,e" p. 8. 
47The description of Regions comes from Ith Sarin. By April 1974 seven Mili­
tary Regions existed, each with a three-digit code number. Only senior cadre offi­
cials knew the numbers for Regions and Sectors; others referred to them as Ith Sarin 
does: the Regions by compass point and the sectors by toponym. The regional repre­
sentatives in the People's Representative Assembly elected 20  March 1976 come from 
the Eastern, Southwestern, Northwestern, Northern, Western Regions and from the Siem 
Reap-Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Kratie, Rattanakiri-Stung Treng, and Mondolkiri 
Sectors. 
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F- 11 1  bombers and finally broke a month before the U . S .  bombing halt after taking a 
key bridge only twelve kilometers south of the capital ' s  airport on Route 3 .  This 
effort severely damaged Southwest Region forces and they displayed remarkably bad 
coordination in the next dry season ' s  offensive against Phnom Penh. A large part of 
their indifferent success in the 1975 offensive came from the greatly improved cali­
bre of Republ i can troop commanders facing them. 
The party used its youth organization, the Alleiance of Communist Youth of 
Kampuchea (Yuv . K . K . --Sampoan Yuvachun Kommunis Kampuchea) as cutting edge and prime 
source of recruitment into the party itself. Youth came to be the party ' s  right arm 
under its direct control ;  the party "educated, watched,  nourished and built youth as 
the central force in the revolutionary movement of each era and as the central force 
for future national construction .e114 8  In southeastern Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge gave 
intensive political training to members of the patriotic youth association, a NUFK 
rather than a party organ. Training took place during two or three weeks at remote 
centerse. Returning youngsters fiercely condemned religion and custom, rejected 
parental authority and showed a militant attitude with marked confidence in mechani­
cal weapons and a rejection of the mysticale. Although the trained youth still  lived 
at home , they ceased working the family plot and instead worked on those fields under 
direct youth association control .e4 9  
The Yuv . K . K .  itsel f came to draw heavily from soldiers of all ranks .  Recent 
refugees have commented on the youth of guards in villages for relocated former 
urban-dwel lerse. Weekl y  political meetings in these areas concentrate .on production , 
perhaps reflecting the low level of these youngsterse' political education as much as 
the genuine need for heightened rice yields .e50 
Although security needs must now predominate , Cambodia ' s  present rulers c learly 
see a continuing political role for youthe. A January 1976 broadcast praised Khmer 
youth for its resolution to continue rejecting such non-revolut ionary concepts as 
"private property, personality, vanitye.e1 1 5 1  This despite the new Constitution which 
shortly before had affirmed that articles of everyday use woul d  remain in private 
handse. 
Ith Sarin gave no detai l s  on the other key source of party memberse, the Asso­
ciation of Democratic Women of Kampuchea. He l isted no other party organizations in 
his book and his paper left the issue somewhat confused. His companion, however, 
whom I interviewed in Phnom Penh in mid-1973,  said that a series of parallel organi­
zations matched each one from the Front with another from the party. Front organi ­
zations termed themselves "Patriotic" while party organizations labeled themselves 
"Democratic . "  The latter recruited members of the former whose political conscious­
ness had developed. The clandestine radio gave a l ist of these "Patriotic" organiza­
tions for monks ,  youth, women, workers , farmers and intel l ectuals in the preface to 
the report of the NUFK 's  First National Congress .e52 
48y-yp, p . 19  . 
4 9U . S .  Department of State, U . S .  Consulate Can Tho (Vietnam)e: Kenneth Quinn 
"The Khmer Krahom Program to create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodi a , "  Febru­
ary 19 ,  1974, pp. 17-18 .  This declassified airgram assembles a wide variety of 
inte l l igence reports and refugee comments for a detail ed look at PKK programs in 
Kampot, southern Kandal and Svay Rieng provinces .  I will cite it hereafter as Quinn , 
"The Khmer Krahome. "  
5 0Wil l iam Shawcross , "Cambodia under its New Rulers , "  New York Review of Books 
(March 4 ,  1976) , p .  2 5 .  
51 F BIS-APA, IV, Noe. 19 (January 2 8 ,  1976)e. 
52FBIS,  Daily Reporte, No. 142 (July 24 , 1973) , gives the l ist ,  translated from 
Khmer, which minimizes possible confusion in translation from Khmer to French to English . 
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Ideology and Programs 
The continuing use of the term "revolutionary" to describe themselves shows 
that total victory means more to the leadership than merely defeating the "Lon Nol 
clique" or "American Imperialism.·" · They demand basic changes in  Cambodian society 
and personality which require inculcating new values under a discipline unknown to 
modern Cambodia. In contrast to their Vietnamese neighbors, the party rigidly en­
forces its new values, possibly because not even senior cadre have the experience 
that generates an institutional self-confidence basic to pragmatic, flexible imple­
mentation of principles. Moreover, Cambodia's small  population may encourage party
leaders to push "proletarianiezation,e" arguing that they can control any sharp popu­
lar reaction because they control internal communications and each area contains too 
small a fraction of the population to start a successful revolt. 
The Organization's discipline most strongly sets it apart from the rest of 
Khmer society. Hanging overall, the discipline restricts travel, insists cadre- adopt 
"revolutionary names" to ensure security, and demands punctual, scheduled performance 
of all tasks according to set procedures. An individual who tries hard but fails 
despite following instructions still takes the blame because the party does not make 
mistakes. The discipline demands self-reliance and emphasizes "mastery of the task 
at hand" and never depending on foreigners.e5 3  Radio Phnom Penh has strongly stressed 
the ideal of self-reliance during the past year. 
Ith Sarin laid out the program for building the kind of cadre which Ieng Sary 
(above) said the movement needs. All personnel of the "Angkar,"  including military 
and or9inary peasants, engage in weekly criticism and self-criticism sessions aimed 
to root ·out "individualistic, personal" character traits. Cadre also perform re­
quired manual activities such as chopping firewood and helping out during the agri­
culetural cycle, all the while carefully  watching each other for non-revolutionary 
behavior in eating, drinking, talking, late-rising, etc. This combination of criti­
cism/self-criticism for all and manual activities for the cadre aims to build proper 
socialists and prepares the cadre to endure future hardships. 
The party clearly analyzed and condemned the gap which traditional officialdom 
created between themselves and the people off whom they lived. Cadre-building con­
centrated on forcing "Angkar" officials to "study from the people to become like the 
people.e1 1 54 The Organization attacked the chronic diseases of Khmer bureaucrats: 
officiousness, authoritarianism, and affecting a lifestyle different from that of 
the peasant. The approach. contrasts markedly with the attitude of a middle-level 
Khmer Republican official who once asked why Americans cared so much for what Khmer 
peasants thought. In a hint of things to come, however, Ith Sarin also noted that 
the Organization had a saying about not always letting the people lead them around 
by the nose. 
Khieu Samphan clearly sparked this approach to cadre-building. His own life­
style on returning to Cambodia in 1959 and during the years when he served as a 
National Assembly Deputy strongly contrasted with the cognac and concubine circuit 
of his peers. As a newspaper publisher he seized every occasion to extol the simple 
life of the ordinary Khmer. A notable exposition of his views on officialdom used 
Sihanouk ' s  own words, as was customary for government critics, to decry Cambodia's 
lack of qualified cadre. Khieu Samphan expanded on the idea by emphasizing that 
civil servants needed practical experience to back up their theory and that their 
5 3see Ith Sarin, SPK, pp. 48-60; Ieng Sary, interviewed in Le Monde of January 
15, 1972, emphasizes the aim of self-reliance. 
54Ith Sarin, SPK, p. 48. 
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attitude toward the people "plays a great role . "  Giving l ip service to Sihanouk ' s  
good example,  he observed that most civil servants had abandoned "haughteiness and 
prideful attitudes . "  But , even with the correct attitude, civil servants also needed 
to know the innermost desires of the peopl e .  "To learn from the people is to perfect 
one ' s  knowledge, to verify the theory learned at school by the experiences of lifee. 
It is to learn to really love the people . "  Bribery and corruption fade if the func­
tionary respects the people,  he concluded .e55  
In March 1972 Hou Yuon outleined the qualities of cadre in  terms which expanded 
on the ideas of Khieu Samphan ,and Ieng Sary and which Ith Sarin subsequently repeated . 
Speaking on the Voice of the NUFK Hou Yuon declared that , having been selected from 
the people ,  Front administrative cadre " l ive l ike anybody else ,  work l ike anybody 
else and understand the people . . .  the administrative cadre are thoroughly indoc­
trinated in their duties to serve the people by means of mass activities as well as 
by teaching them about the morality of patriots . . .  which are based on love for 
the people, respect for the people ,  and loyalty to the people .  The people are served 
whoeleheartedly and with utmost sincerity . . .  politely and courteously treated and 
not as if being treated by dictators , officials ,  or mil itary autocratse. The opinions 
of the col lective groups are respected and the soleidarity between the cadre and the 
people is upheld . 11  56 
Cadre development and building the peasantry also depended on party education. 
Political education took place at special political study schools ,  at work , at · 
conferences and informal lecturese. Educational documents emanated from the party 
central corronittee .e57  The Organization tailored education to the political sophisti­
cation of the studente. Ith Sarin wrote that Front cadre used documents appropriate 
for Sihanoukism. The more politically-aware studied documents dealing with the 
division of Khmer society into classes ; class struggle;  mass view; building prole­
tarian principles;  criticism and self-criticism, and others .e58 
The party ' s  own 1973 analysis of class divisions of Khmer society put a "feudal , 
imperialistic , capitalist, reactionary, and oppressor class" over an oppressed class 
of "worker-farmers , poor and lower-middle peasants . 115 9  Radio Phnom Penh echoed this 
earlier formulation when an April 1975 Special National Congress acknowledged that 
the chief winners of the 1 7  April victory were "the people--especially workers , poor 
and lower-middl e  farmers ,  and other l aborers in the rural areas and towns comprising 
more than 95 per cent of the entire Cambodian population . 116 0 Ith Sarin especially 
remarked on the particular attention cadre performing manual l abor gave to poor 
farmers and said such help gained the party far more support than instruction in 
political theory did. 6 1  
Further analysis concentrated on l and rents and rural indebtednesse. "Feudal 
landowners ,"  according to the party, exploited poor and lower-middl e  peasants through
62rents for fields and interest on borrowed money .e Although only this one source 
cites the problem, apparently the modern party restricts class enemies to the cate­
gory of landlordse. Hu Nim' s  Sihanouk-era doctoral thesis ,  as outlined below, clearly 
5 5L 'Observateur (Phnom Penh)e, November 1 3 ,  1959, carries the comment under the 
headlinee, "The Civil Servant and Social Progress . "  
56FBIS-APA, IV,  Noe. 62 (March 29,  1973) from the Voice of NUFK in Khmer of 
March 25e, 1973e. 
571th Sarin, SPK, p .  67e. 58 Ith Sarin, SPK, p .  65e. 
59y_yp, p .  1 3 .  6 0FBIS-APA, IV , No .  82 (Apriel 2 8 ,  1975)e. 
6 1 Ith Sarin, SPK, p .  59 .  6 2 _y yp, p .  15 
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added "rich peasants" to the exploiting class. For comparison, the Vietnamese commu­
nists limit class enemies to landlords, i. e . ,  those who live entirely from rents ; 
while the Chinese add "rich peasants," defined as· those who can individually farm 
only part of their large holdings and must hire labor or rent out the rest ._6 3 The 
Vietnamese still acknowledge the existence of "rich _epeasants" while Cambodian radio 
now mentions only "poor and lower-middle peasants ."  
Khieu Samphan stated his view of the landlord and rural indebtedness problems 
in his 1959 doctoral dissertation.e64 Hu Nim tried to document the situation with 
statistics from the 1962 c�nsus in part of his own dissertation in 1965.e6 5  Khieu 
Samphan also used his newspaper, L'Observateur, to publish the conclusions he reached 
in his thesis.e6 6  In Khieu Samphan 's belief, an unfavorable balance of payments and 
transfer of the multiplier effect6 7  abroad due to the importation of needed indus­
trial material severely hampered Cambodia's own industrialiezation. The integration 
of the Khmer economy into international commodity and capital markets caused the 
deficit due to a growing Western absolute advantage in industrial products and con­
sequent decline in the value of Cambodia's exports of primary products. Cambodia 's 
"pre-capitalist" production, both agricultural and artisanal, proved unabl e  to -com­
pete, and he noted a trend for population density on arable land to increase, exacer­
bating the already excessive leisure of Khmer farmers.e6 8  Landowners sharpened their 
exploitation of peasants to get more export products for foreign marketse. Usurers, 
whom Khieu Samphan asserts generally include landowners or wholesale commission 
dealers, profit by a decline in the well-being of artisans and peasants who are un­
able to compete with foreign goods to lend money at usurious rates. The import/export 
business also sparks the formation of a whole new field of intermediate-commerce 
middlemen. The Chinese might have become national bourgeoisie, favoring the develop­
ment of independent national capitalism, he - adds, but international integration 
causes them to become the middlemen.e6 9  The "rich" classes then increase consumption 
of imported luxury goods and intensify accumulation of wealth in specie and gems 
causing the balance of payments deficits.e70 
Khieu Samphan proposed structural changes to turn "landowners, middlemen and 
loan sharks" into a class .of "agricultural or industerial capitalist entrepreneurs." 
6 3David P .  Ell iott, "Revolutionary Re-Integration: A Comparison of the Founda­
tion of Post Liberation Political Systems in North Vietnam and China" (Doctoral Dis­
sertation, Cornell University, 1976).  For a more detailed definition of Chinese 
rural social structure see Theodore Chen (ed. ) ,  The Chinese Communist Regime: Do�­
ments and, Commentary (New York, 1967) , pp. 204-205. 
64Khieu Samphan, "The Economy of Cambodia and Its Problems with Industrializa­
tion" (Translation by U.S. Depte. of S�ate, Doctoral Dissertation, University of 
Paris ; 1959)e. 
6 5Hu Nim, "Les Services Publics Economiques au Cambodge" (Doctoral Disserta­
tion, Royal University of Phnom Penh, 1965)e. 
6 6For example, in a series of articles in L'Observateur (Phnom Penh) which 
began 7 June 1960, entitled "Le Commerce Exterieur du Cambodge." 
6 7Khieu Samphan refers here to the effect produced when a given income is con­
sumed and saved. The amount consumed becomes income of others in a repeating pattern 
which effectively results in a greater total income than thee.eoriginal input. If  the 
income goes to foreigners, the effect occurs abroad with no benefit to Cambodia. 
68Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," p. 26. 
69Ibide. ,  pp. 46-47. 7 0Ibid. ,  pp. 55-57. 
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The government would force reductions _in land rents and interest rates, inducing 
landowners to "reorganize holdings and institute more capital-intensive practices 
and wage l abor. Such a profound transformation would demand "a whole system of very 
severe measures," starting with the tight control of foreign trade.7 1  I n  addition, 
both l arge landholders and peasants would be educated to see the need for the re­
forms. 72 
In the rural areas, lowering land and interest rates, both essential to re­
storing peasant morale, needed not only tough government decrees but also government­
backed peasant action. Fighting usury, Khieu Samphan continues, required the organi­
zation of autonomous peasant credit cooperatives, "managed and run by the peasants 
themselves.11e7 3  In  order to increase production, Khieu Samphan saw a need systemati­
cally to generalize the traditional Khmer peasant practice of working in teams of 
several families for mutual aid during transplanting and harvesting. "Mutual aid 
could be engaged in at first for a specific job, then gradually expanded until it 
becomes the rule; it could help in the establishment of production cooperatives in 
the villages . . .  [the] production cooperatives could spread centrifugally. 1 1e74 The 
peasant association, he later el aborated, should unite peasants at the level of their 
community using the framework of the Khum with the aim that the number of such asso­
ciations should equal the number of Khum.7 5  
Hu Nim, working on a more substantial statistical base, gave a more precise 
analysis of Cambodia's agrarian structures. He set forth a division of Khmer land­
owners on the basis of the realities of returns to agriculeture in Cambodia. In his 
schema, "landed proprietors" owned ten or more hectares of land but did not work it 
themselves,. instead living by "exploiting the peasants" through rents or sharecrop­
ping. Usurers fit in this group. "Rich peasants" also owned land but exploited 
part and rented out the rest; they generally used wage labor and lived well on hold­
ings of more than five hectares. "Middle peasants" owned from 2 to 5 hectares which 
they and their families worked without outside help and had elementary agricultural 
implements. They sometimes rented additional land to feed their l arge families. 
"Poor peasants" who formed "the great majority" may have owned a bit of land but no 
tools, or tools but no land. They rented or sharecropped to make ends meet. If they 
owned land, they had less than one hectare of market gardens on the river banks or 
l ess than two hectares in the inleand rice areas. Finally, a class of "agricultural 
wage-earners" owned neither land nor tools and sold its labor.7 6  This l ast group, 
the "agricultural proletariat," accounted for 6.6 per cent of the active population 
or 1 56,700 people, by 1962 census figures. 77 Hu Nim ' s  categories and definitions 
basically duplicate the Chinese communist analysis of c lass structure in the country­
side. 7 8 His open use of this Chinese model came at a time when Sihanouk's Cambodia 
and the People's Republic enjoyed very close relations. Indeed, Hu Nim became a 
vice-president and then president of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association until 
September 1967, when Sihanouk disbanded it in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, 
7 1Khieu Samphan, "The Economy,e" p. 69. 
72L'Obseroateur (Phnom Penh), August 2 ,  1960. 
73Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," p. 1 04; and L'Observateur (Phnom Penh), Febru-
ary 12, 1960. 
74Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," pp. 105-106. 
75L'Obseroateur (Phnom Penh), February 12, 1960. 
.76Hu Nim, "Les Services,e" pp. 96-97. 77 bI '[,d . , 97-98.pp . 
78Theodore Chen (ed. ) ,  The Chinese Communist Regime, pp. 204-205. 
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95, 
charging Chinese interference in Cambodian -internal affairse. Hu Nim then joined 
Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon in the bush. 
Hu Nim paid close attention to landetenancy and particularly to sharecropping .
and renting land. He noted that Khmer landholding, despite its fragmentation, tended 
toward concentration especieally over the previous ten yearse. Although he admitted 
that the division of land into small parcels dominated both riverbank holdings and 
paddies in the fertile regions, "nevertheless, the tendency toward a concentration 
is marked, not only in the new areas of extension , but likewise, in still limited 
proportion , on the fragmented regions themselves.e1179 
Proving a tendency for land to concentrate in large holdings along riverbanks 
escaped him. He cited census figures for 1962 which showed .ethat 31 per cent of the 
836,000 agricultural families owned only 5 per cent of the cultivated land and noted 
that 86 per cent of all families owned fewer than 5 hectares eache. In 1956, 92 per 
cent of the 727,000 farming families owned less than 5 hectares ; accordingly, he 
argued that "the number [sic] of small landowners decreased while that of middle and 
large landowners increased .e118 0 In fact, the populeation increase meant that the 
nwnber of small holders actually increased from 669,000 families in 1956 (92 per 
cent of 727,000) to 718,000 in 1962 (86 per cent of 835,000)e. The extension of 
ricelands, incomplete tenure records and major discrepancies between figures for 
land owned and land actually sowed further complicates the picturee. 
Hu Nim concluded that the fragmented tenure structure with its tendency toward 
concentration poses problemse. The "feeble development" of capitalism in Cambodia 
forestalled the production-increasing technological benefits of concentrated holdings
8 1in favor of speculation in land including renting and sharecropping . Land rent 
from sharecropping and the system of rent fixed in specie or, more usually, in paddy 
before planting, "is the direct exploitation by Zanded proprietors and rich peasants 
of the poorest stratum of the peasants .e1182 Hu Nim argued that the 1962 census figures 
on renting and sharecropping did not accurately reflect the situation since many of 
the very small landowners had to rent land or sell their labor in order to subsist. 
He estimated that 25 per cent of the agricultural families rented or were sharecrop­
perse.e8 3 
These two analyses here primarily serve to show a continuity between the ideas 
and programs of the party in the 1970s and those of two leading leftists of the late 
1950s and 1960s. If  accurate, however, the analyses could indicate the extent of 
rural discontent and provide grounds for peasants to support the revolution indepen­
dent of Sihanouk ' s  popularity .  Khieu Samphan, for example, claimed to see a "rural 
explosion" in the making due to agrarian structural imbalance .e84  Ith Sarin, on the 
other hand, described both NVA/VC and Khmer Rouge tactics to mobilize the peasantry 
by using Sihanouk ' s  great popularity .e8 5  
Independent study of  Khmer agriculture and land tenure both refutes and sup­
ports elements of the Khieu Samphan-Hu Nim thesis .  On the basis of research during 
79Hu Nim, "Les Servicese, "  p. 85e. 
80Ibid. ,  p .  88 . 
8 1  Ibid. ,  p .  89 . 
82Ibid. ,  p .  with my emphasis addede. 
8 3Ibid. ,  p .  96. 
84Khieu Samphan, "The Economy,e" p .  61e. 
85Ith Sarin, SPK, pp. 74-75. 
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get an idea.e1 1 9 0  
the 1950s, Jean Delvert did not cite landlords among the problems of the Khmer peas­
ant. Rural debt, he noted, mounted as peasants bought on credit against part of 
their harvest or borrowed money for other needs such as the heavy expenses of crema­
tions. Delvert suggests, however, that peasants "did not find their domination by 
traders too onerous and could support their victimization by usurers.e1186 He main­
tained this view in 1970 after numerous field trips to Cambodia since publishing his 
1961 classic, Le Paysan Cambodgien.8 7  
In law, the farmer who tilled land for five consecutive years became its ownere, 
thereby assuring the rights of,ethe man who put the plow to the ground. This basis 
of land tenure did not change. What did change was the size of peasant holdings as 
more and more children inherited smaller and smaller parcels, especially in the well­
watered areas. In  the mid-1960s, for example, a study of a Khum along the Mekong in 
densely populated Kompong Cham province showed that private owners divided 83 per 
cent of the farmland into over 6, 000 fragmented holdings averaging j ust over one­
quarter hectare apiece.e8 8  The Khum included 1, 500 houses and total land in private 
hands reached 1,600 hectares, but, as residents owned land in other Khum and out­
siders owned land in the Khum under study, calculation of average landholding proved 
impossible. 
A United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expert's report based 
on work in 1967 and 1968 concluded that "direct owner cultivation is the widestspread 
mode of exploitation.e118 9  However, the study noted that "it is impossible to deter­
mine the number of exploiters and the area they exploit, either in direct cultivation 
by renting 
than 20 hectares 
and sharecropping. It will be necessary to await the 1970 census toor 
In Svay Rieng province the study examined 111 properties larger 
and found that 76 of these "great landed proprietors," in Hu Nim's 
all their own land.e9 1  Where tenancy held, sharecropping prevailedterms, cultivated 
and generally demanded 50 per cent of the harvest, a much heavier rate than that 
charged to rent the land before planting. Significantly , the calculation · of returns 
to agriculture showed that sharecropping on poor rice fields of Kompong Speu province, 
a badly waterede, infertile area, produces a very heavy monthly deficit. Owner culti­
vation in Kompong Speu netted a disposable monthly surplus (after subtracting con­
sumption requirements) which equaled that of sharecroppers on rich land in Battambang 
86Jean Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien (Paris, 1961), pp. 652-653. The statement 
is part of his conclusions and in context reads, "The peasant, does he want to [in­
tensify agricultural practices and diversify crops]e? Everywhere, in effect, they are 
the masters of the land. Small holders exploiting directly with the help of their 
families. A true peasantry therefore. Rural Democracye, rare in Asia. Dominated by 
the trader certainly, but served by him likewise and less burdensome, perhaps, than 
one might think. Victim of usury certainly,  but the usurer here is not the great 
landowner and he is more easily borne.e" 
87Jean Delvert, "Les Paysans Cambodgiens dans la Tourmente," Le Figaro (Paris), 
July 2 ,  1970. 
8 8Milada Kalab, "Study of a Cambodian Village , "  Geographical Journal (London), 
134, No. 4 (December 1968) , pp. 521-523. The king , kingdom and wats owned the re­
maining 17 per cent of the land. 
89Rene Lefebvre, Rapport sur l 'Eeonomie Agricole du Royawne du Cambodge (Phnom 
Penh, 1968), p. 97. 
90ibid.e, p. 100. 
9 1Ibid. 
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province. Owner cultivation in Battambang produced a disposable surplus four .times 
greater than sharecropping. 92 
By 1968 the lands along the riverbanks had diversified into green beans, 
sesame, tobacco, maize, and other market garden crops. The shift was well underway 
even in 1963 at which time the per hectare return from these crops was double to 
quadruple that of paddy.o93 Finally, the FAO expert 's  study tried to compare rural 
returns with urban salaries but could only say that 68 per cent of farmers gained 
less than 1, 000 riels/month while only 29 per cent of urban wage-earners made less 
than that. 94 
In Delvert's  time Chinese rural creditors could not take land since it could 
not be alienated. Instead they took part of the harvest which their urban Chinese 
connections ideally fixed them to market. By 1966, however, Cambodia ' s  cooperative 
movement had enrolled a third of the farming families. · The cooperatives extended 
credit, provided storage for paddy to keep supply and hence price smoother over a 
longer period of time or for eventual purchase by the national export company, and 
ran reasonably priced stores.o95 All of these activities sought to undercut the rural 
trader and moneylender. The FAO study, however, noted very poor reimbursement rates 
for cooperative loans.  Although unable to estimate the scale of recourse to usurious 
loans, the PAO expert noted that the 12 per cent monthly interest rate during the 
agricultural season particularly weighed on the regions poorest in soil; he argued 
that peasants paid the moneylender first, thus explaining the poor rate of coopera­
tive loan repayment. The moneylender supplied year-round needs for consumption as 
wel 1 as loans for production, and the peas·ant recognized his priority for repaymento. 96 
Although much more can probably be done with even the poor data available, the 
independent studies lead to a mixed reception of the Khieu Samphan-HuoNim analysis. 
Specifically, landlordism does not emerge as a major national problem, although in 
some areas peas-ants engaged totally in sharecropping must have felt s·evere pressure. 
Peasants on the lower end of rural revenues must als-o have made invidious comparisons 
between their lot and that of city dwellers, particularly as they entered the city 
for seasonal work, for example as cyclo (pedicab) pedaller. A fourfold difference 
in surplus income from rich riceland in Battambang may also have galled, depending 
on how the owner cultivator distributed his surplus; that is, whether he in fact 
spent it on luxury imports or rather on the local wat and/or rites of passage for 
his children in which his neighbors participated. All in all, the case for a 
national rural tinderbox remains to be proved. 
One area, however, produced significant rural unrest during the Sihanouk era. 
Putting outlying arable land into production often demanded heavy investment in irri­
gation and/or large-scale land clearing. These outlying areas developed the Siha­
nouk era ' s  largest landholdings as Khmer officials and Khmer of Chinese origin began 
large-scale mechanized riziculture in northern Battambang province in the 1950s. In 
southwest Battambang province land questions unclearly entered into a March-April 
1967 peasant uprising around Samlaut. In recent years, Sihanouk has claimed that 
then Prime Minister Lon Nol 's  troops sparked the revolt by trying to evict peasant 
92Rene Lefebvre, RappoPt, pp. 226-22 7. 
9 3My analysis from figures in the Ministere de ! ' Agricultureo' s  Bulletin de la 
Statistique des Etudes AgPiaoles (Phnom Penh, 1963)o. 
94Rene Lefebvre, Rapport, p. 236. 
9 5Remy Prud'homme, L'Eaonomie du Cambodge (Paris, 1969), pp. 188-191 and Table 
60, p. 2 78. 
96Rene Lefebvre, RappoPt; pp. 72 and 76. 
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cultivators from l ands they had cleared, in favor of  high government official deed­
holders .e97 At the time of the outbreak, however, the Prince told the nation that 
Khmer Rouge were attacking members of.ehis youth league farming on areas which the 
Viet Minh had held earlier and that the "Reds" had also hit a number of provincial 
guard posts and burned bridge s .  Sihanouk gave Lon Nol orders to suppress the out­
break and led the invective against Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon which caused them to 
flee to the bush in late April 1967 where Hu Nim, as noted above , joined them later 
in the year. 98 The Prince also excoriated the governor of Battambang,  promising to 
transfer him and end corruption in the provincial administration. Whatever the 
reality, the PKK has seized on the Samlaut revolt  as a milestone marking its return 
to armed struggle and, presumably, as proof of the accuracy of its class analysi s .  
Since 1970 the party has increasingly pressed for greater col lectivization of 
agriculture . Land reform led the Chinese and Vietnamese efforts to collectivize 
agriculture and information from Cambodia suggests that the Khmer ,  too, instituted 
land reform where applicable .  In areas where they regrouped population during the 
war, the Khmer Rouge, however, apparently skipped directly into more advanced stages 
of  collectivization. 
Ieng Sary told a North Vietnamese interviewer in January 1972 that land rent 
still  existed but was much reduced in zones under NUFK control and that usurious 
interest rates were forbidden .e99  Moreover,  part of  the produce of state-farmed l ands 
of landowners forced to be absent from their farms for reasons other than "treason" 
were put aside against their returne. Peasants without l and could work .el ands left 
idle by those fighting for the NUFK against payment of a smal l  rente. The NUFK, Ieng 
Sary added, encouraged the creation of production and consumption cooperatives to 
eliminate middlemen . For agricultural production they developed many mutual aid 
movements among the peasants, he said, in a possible echo of Khieu Samphan ' s  sugges­
tion to systematize traditional mutual aid groupse. 
Details of sweeping l and reforms in 1972 come from rural Kampot province in 
southeastern Cambodia.el O O  In Kompong Trach district authorities limited individual 
ricefield holdings to five hectares and market garden fields to one hectaree. The 
Khmer Rouge confiscated paddies over that l imit and gave them to people with fewer 
than five hectares or to People ' s  Associations in the vil lagese. Local governments 
kept control over excess orchards and market garden holdingse. In more heavily popu­
lated Kandal province the authorities confiscated all  l and and then parcelled it out 
1n one-hectare plots per family .  
Colelectivization operated in two different systemse. The lowest level of  gov­
ernment, an "inter-family group" composed of 12- 15  families headed by a group chair­
man whom the hamlet chief picked, implemented the task of agriculetural production. 
In one system. starting in 1972 the individual fami ly kept responsibility for til 1 ing 
a particular piece of riceland but the entire group harvested together and stored 
the paddy at a central pointe. The group chairman distributed an equal daily ratione· 
of rice . The village government bought the surplus and the chairman kept the money 
97Norodom Sihanouk and Wilefred Burchett, My War with the CIA (Baltimore , 1 973) , 
pp. 62-63. 
98FBIS, Daily Report for April 6 ,  1 3  and for May S ,  1967 carry the text of 
Sihanouk ' s  speeches on the uprising, attacks on the leftist Deputies , and announce­
ment of their disappearance. 
99Le Cou:t>rier du Viet Nam (Hanoi)e, January 3 1 ,  1972e. 
l O Oquinn, "The Khmer Krahom, "  pp. 27-29, 33, provides the material for this 
and the fol l owing paragraph . 
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for special needs such as medicine or farm equipment. In the other system the group 
held land in common and all aspects of rice-growing took place in common from plowing 
to harvesting. Distribution of produce was the same. Areas in which villages had 
resettled all used the second system. 
Elsewhere in Cambodia in l ate 1972 peasants living northwest of Kompong Speu 
could and did withdraw from collective experiments. At that time, a collective meant 
common storehouses and paddy fields; small groups of villagers lived in collectivity 
with the aim of awakening a socialist consciousness among peasants. 1 0 o1 
Ieng Sary ' s  description points to the institution of lower-level agricultural 
production cooperatives, a stage of collectivization wherein the division of produce 
depends to a degree on the capital in land or tools which a peasant initially pro­
vides. The actual situation in southeastern Cambodia from 1972 argues for a transi­
tion to a higher level stage with equal division of produce and more holdings in 
common. In 1976 Radio Phnom Penh outlined the function of "peasant production coop­
eratives,i' a more inclusive concept than the "solidarity group for increasing produc­
tion11 1 02 featured so prominently just after the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia. 
Divided into solidarity groups of about ten families each, 1 0 3 the production coopera­
tive, "now assuming the nature of a Phum (hamlet) ,"  mobilizes basic peasant forces 
to conduct production work in all fields; handles communication and transport of its 
products; deals with education, culture, welfare, and sanitation; barters for goods, 
ensures security, and inculcates in the peasantry the Organization 's  political, 
economic, military, social, and cultural lines.o1 0 4 The Khmer have apparently moved 
their basic agricultural decision-making center from the equivalent of the production 
team (the inter-family or solidarity group) up to the echelon of the hamlet during 
the year. The evidence, mainly refugee reportso, suggests that distribution of pro­
duction now depends entirely on work rather than capital input which means , if true, 
that the Khmer have also moved from the lower level to higher level agricultural 
production cooperatives throughout the country in the astonishing space of one year. 
In contrast, the Chinese spent the first half of the 1950s installing qualified 
rural cadre before they moved to this higher level which preceded their unhappy ex­
1 0 5perience with communes.o The North Vietnamese also moved cautiously on cooperativ­
ization. From 1958 to 1960 they moved all cooperatives into the lower level stage. 
By 1965 half the cooperatives should have moved to·othe higher level. As for size, 
by mid-1961 three-fourths of Vietnamese cooperatives had reached the point where the 
hamlet became the headquarters for distribution of work assignments and compensationo. 
1 0 1Ith Sarin, "Nine Months,o" p. 1 2 .  
1 02since their victory Radio Phnom Penh has claimed that solidarity groups for 
increasing production formed in 1973o. The earliest contemporary reference I have 
seen dates to September 1974 and describes solidarity groups for increasing produc­
tion in the Samlaut area. See NUFK Information Office _(Peking) , "Samleli. vidyu . 
ranasirs ruap ruam jati kambuja," 152 (September 23, 1974)o. The term "peasant pro­
duction cooperative" appeared in early 1976 and has been shortened in recent radio 
broadcasts to "peasant. cooperative . "  Radio Phnom Penh claimed May 19, 1974 as the 
founding date of the peasant cooperative. See FBIS, May 21, 1976 report of a May 20 
Phnom Penh radio broadcast on the subject. 
1 0 3william Shawcross, "Cambodia," p. 26.  
l 04FBIS-APA, IV, No. 23 (February 3, 1976). FBIS originally translated the 
cooperatives as "assuming the nature of a village"; checking their tape resulted in 
confirmation of the term "Phum (hamlet)" instead. 
1 0 5Franz Schurman and Orville Schell ,  The China Reader: Communist China (New 
York, 1967)o, p. 175o. 
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The Vietnamese have kept accounting at this level as a matter of best agricultural 
management. In 1961 the Chinese lowered their level of accounting to the production 
team, which in China has the same size as the Vietnamese hamlet and may be the most 
rational basic decision-making element to ensure agricultural efficiency.e1 O 6  Khieu 
Samphan'es 1960 contention that cooperatives should function at the level of the Khum 
hints that the Khmer may try to raise the managerial headquarters to a higher echelon 
at some point in the future. 
That production cooperatives become like ·hamlets suggests the nature of party­
sponsored changes in traditional settlement , religious support and activity patterns. 
Traditionally residents saw a Phum as a group of houses supporting a particular 
monastery.e1 0 7  The PKK, however, has treated the Sangha with varying degrees of 
harshness. A refugee with whom I talked in mid-1975 said that in Kompong Cham prov­
ince older monks could remain at the wat while younger monks were required to rejoin 
secular life. Other refugees talked of entire monasteries being emptied. The 1976 
Constitution ends Buddhism's role as the state religion, declaring that everyone has 
freedom of worship except of "reactionary" religions, or has freedom not to worship 
at all. New settlement areas most probably do not devote resources, now collectively 
owned, to build monasteries, and the production cooperative apparently serves to re­
place the ritual and ceremonial center of the local wat as the focus for social 
organization. 
In a country as underpopulated as Cambodia, concern should lie with control of 
manpower, a traditional Southeast Asian aim, rather than the more Western attention 
to control of territory. Both elements figured in the war as the result of more 
"Westernized" leadership on both sides. The Khmer Rouge and the Republicans both 
initially went all-out to gain control of as many people as possible. The Lon Nol 
government welcomed refugees whom it could not feed without outside help.e108 At the 
same time, the Republicans refused to give up outlying positions which they could 
resupply only with the greatest difficulty. Into 1972 the Khmer Rouge raided Repub­
lican territory after population and would relocate entire villages deep in their 
zones.e1 0 9  
The Khmer Rouge changed this pattern in 1973 by emphasizing quality of control 
rather than sheer numbers. They took advantage of opportunities to gather population 
which their military activity created for them. But, they less and less specifically 
aimed military activities at population-gathering and more at meeting Republican 
troops and cutting lines of supply.e1 10 Ith Sarin, on the basis of experience in 
106oavid P. Elliott, "Revolutionary Re-Integration," pp. 460-462 and 513-514. 
1 0 7Milada Kalab, "Study,e" pp. 523 and 529. 
1 08At a 21  November 1974 press conference, Khmer Republican Prime Minister Long 
Boret reported that 350,000 refugees entered his government' s  zone in 1974 alone. 
U.S. bombing had ended in August 1973 and military action centered around Phnom Penh 
and lower Route 4 to the Gulf of Siam during the 1973-1974 dry season. Refugees took 
advantage of thinner Khmer Rouge control to flee to Republican zones, aided by aggres­
sive patrolling, particularly from the Kompong Thom enclave. See also Donald Kirk, 
"Revolution and Political Violencee_ein Cambodia,e" in Joseph Zasloff (ed.), Corronunism 
in Indoehina(Lexington, Mass. , 1975), p. 225. 
1 0 9Nokor Thom (Phnom Penh), July 11, 1972e, discusses kidnapping of villagers 
1n Kanda! and Takeo provinces. 
1 1 0Toe single greatest increase in population for the Khmer Rouge in 1973 came 
when they penetrated to within 100 meters of the governor's mansion at Kompong Cham 
city after a two- week siege. After taking the bulk of the provincial capital, t hey 
2 1  
1972, wrote of the Khmer Rouge's refined approach toward the people. By late 1973 
and early 1974, Khmer refugees into both South Vietnam and the Kompong Thorn enclave 
spoke of harsh rule and frequent killings.e111 Sometime in 1973 the party apparently 
decided to accelerate its program to alter Khmer society and expected its discipline 
to hold back the peasant migrations which have been the time-honored rural answer to 
repressive government. 
In the absence of party documents, the reasons for the shift, which included 
more rigorous collectivization and an accelerated denigration of .Sihanouk, remain 
uncertain. But, three rnorne*tous events occurred by rnid-1973 which probably forced 
the party's hand. The first, the Paris Acc.ords, created considerable confusion in 
the Sihanouk-Khmer Rouge alliance. The Prince indicated flexibility just after the 
signing, citing "friends" who argued against continued bellicosity while others built 
peace. He returned to public intransigence while in Hanoi for Tet the following 
week, presumably because the insurgency in Cambodia had slapped him down. The PKK 
must have feared for the constancy of its Chinese ·and Vietnamese allies at this 
point. The second event, Sihanouk's short visit to Khmer Rouge-controlled Cambodia, 
must have sharpened the party's appreciation of his continuing popularity among the 
mass. 
Finally, the reality of the end of American bombing took hold. The Khmer 
Rouge, as noted above, attacked Phnom Penh in full force in June and July 1973, de­
spite the imminent halt of American air support for their enemies.e· Fear that the 
Vietnamese would sell them out in a final solution to the war in Vietnam before the 
next dry season made conditions suitable for a renewed .offensive may have influenced 
the Khmer Rouge decision to attack the capital. The Vietnamese, however, finally
concretely showed their continuing support by furnishing heavy weapons units to 
assist in the siege of Kompong Cham in August and early September. Their decision 
to do so must have been made earlier in the summer, perhaps by mid-July when the 
Khmer Rouge had demonstrated their capability by rolling up FANK garrisons along 
Route 6 to the vital road junction with Route 7 at Skoun on the way to Kompong Cham. 
Breathing easier with assured Vietnamese logistical and heavy weapons support, the 
Khmer Rouge would have had the leisure to gauge their progress, which had included 
deep penetration of Republican lines and even a brief closing of the Mekong, and 
realize the corollary poor performance and leadership of most Republican troops. 
Victory must have seemed as near as the next dry season offensive. 
The formal manifestation of a policy shift appeared in July 1973 when the 
"First National Congress" of several hundred delegates, including monks, noted the 
increasing success of Khmer Rouge arms, and decided that the U.S. military interven­
tion must end and that the RGNU/NUFK must replace the Republicans as the sole and 
unique representatives of the Khmer nation and people.e112 Subsequent events have 
shown that such Congresses serve as vehicles for popular ratification of key politi­
cal decisions. The February 1975 Second National Congress publicly reaffirmed the 
led over 15,000 people away before Republican reinforcements arrived and pushed them 
out. Toward the end of the year the Khmer Rouge cut Route 5 between Phnom Penh and 
Battambang and kept the road closed until they won. They had also rolled up Republi­
can garrison towns on Routes 6 and 7 from Phnom Penh to Kornpong Cham before they hit 
the town itself. 
111oonald Kirk, "Revolution," p. 222, and Sheldon Simon, "The Khmer Resistance: 
External Relations 1973-1974," p. 199 and footnote 4 ,  p. 211. Both are in Zasloff 
(ed.), Communism in Indochina. 
1 1 2FBIS, Daily Report, No. 142, July 24, 1973 reporting the July 21, 1973 
Statement of the National Congress from the Voice of the NUFK. 
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decision to fight until  total victory and privately, I beleieve, ratified the decision 
to evacuate the urban population. The immediately post-victory Special National 
Congress decided to retain Sihanouk ahd Penn Nouth as formal l eaders and promulgated 
the party analysis of Khmer class society, laying the groundwork for the new Consti­
tution. The December 1975 Third National Congress ratified the Constitution, thus 
effectively abolishing the monarchy and ending Buddhism ' s  role as the state rel igione. 
Before victory, key political decisions would have required secrecy and the unpub­
l ished internal decisions of the First Congress l ikely dealt with the change in 
attitude toward Sihanouk and an accelerated program of col l ectivization and rural 
control in the interest of increased production and peasant political development .e1 13 
Both the Khmer Issarak and Sihanouk himself laid thee_groundwork for such a use 
of National Congressese. In order to outflank the National Assembly,  in 1957 Siha­
nouk proposed that the Fourth National Congress of the Sangkum should be the nation ' s  
poleicy-making bodye. He has written that the Pracheachon immediately supported the 
idea "for they had once proposed something simil ar . e11 1 1 4 Earlier stil l ,  the Khmer 
Issarak claimed that in Apri l 1950 two hundred representatives of the people and mem­
bers of the Buddhist clergy met in a "Peop l e ' s  Congress" and official ly recognized 
the Viet Minh-oriented wing as "the only national united fron t . e1 1  115 The Cambodeian 
People ' s  Representative Assembly  elected 20 March 1976 presumably marks an end to the 
need for such congresses since the Assembly represents both the people and the armye. 
Conclusions 
A communist party exists in Cambodi a  with the leading role in the revolutione. 
The party sees itself as stemming back to the First Indochina War, with 1951 as the 
date of its founding . Most of its present l eading personalities grew up during and 
after that war and early party figures have disappeared , perhaps to honored obscurity. 
A few leaders left from the 1940s may now begin to emerge in more prominent positionse. 
Major leaders spent considerable time in the bush before 1970 and worked closely with 
the North Vietnamese during the five years of war after S ihanouk ' s  overthrow, but 
nothing indicates they wil l  compromise Cambodia ' s  independence . They actually  main­
tain a wary attitude toward their eastern neighbors. 
Independent analyses of rural Cambodia do not support key e lements of party 
agrarian class analys i s <  The party analysis and programs show a continuity from the 
writings of Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim in the late 1950s to mid-1960se. No direct evi­
dence, however, puts these men in the party at the time of their writing s .  They 
both emerged as leaders in the party and in the government of warteime and postwar 
Cambodia .  
The rigid implementation of party programs suggests a relative lack of  quali­
fied cadre who could be entrusted with a more pragmatic implementation of party 
pol icy.  The brutal implementation of a forced back-to-the-land program since Apri l 
1 1 3Sihanouk felt the shift as evidenced by his intemperate remarks to j ournal ­
ists at the September 1973 Algiers Non-Aligned Conference and especially his remarks 
to Alain Bouc in Le Monde (Paris ) ,  October 27 ,  1973, which cast doubt on his future 
place under the Khmer Rougee. His earlier interview with Oriana Fal laci in the New 
York Times, August 12 ,  1973 (Magazine section) produced the memorabl e  phrase , "The 
Khmer Rouge wil l  spit me out l i ke a cherry stone" when they had done with him. Such 
comments went far to undermine the RGNU case to replace the Khmer Republic  at the 
1973 UN General Assembly .  
1 1 4Sihanouk and Burchett , My War, p .  98 . 
1 1 5Khmer Armed Resistance, p .  · 1 3 .  
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1975 at least partly reflects inadequate control owing to a lack of administrativee· 
cadre. More sophisticated party levels probably recognize the hardships but argue 
that such methods, Cambodia's low population, and its plentiful land can combine to 
bring agricultural production back into surplus. With surplus restored, discontent 
and internal security needs should decline and the party will  have more leisure to 
develop the cadre necessary for a genuine revolution of Khmer social values. 
Elements of organization and ideology have emerged in domestic radio broadcasts 
at an accelerating rate. Class analysis appeared in 1975, and Marxism-Leninism in 
1976. The new Constitution abolished the monarchy and the role of Buddhism in early 
1976. Increasing steps toward collectivization used- the model of youth to decry the 
concept of private property in March 1976. Emphasis on production cooperatives pro­
vides the framework for collective ownership of land and factories which the Consti­
tution ordains. Youthful disdain for private property despite Consti�utional toler­
ance of private ownership of "everyday items" suggests that the party env1s1ons 
further qualitative stages of collectivization. Entering such stages would require 
some preparation, including in theory a constitutional amendment, and the party will 
probably first consolidate and geographically expand the present stage of colelectivi­
zation at the administrative level of the Phum first. 
The party still obscures its ties to the government, hiding behind the "revolu­
tionary organization.e" Ith Sarin believed that "communism is recognized by the 
masses as a regime both inconceivable and incompatible with the national society.e11 116 
The party may indeed fear popular reaction to the impact of the full weight of the 
word "communism,e" particularly if people associate it with the harsh l iving condi­
tions that now prevail.  The party may also be subject to the inertia of having 
operated through a screen as it did in the days of the Pracheachon and through the 
Organization. Internationally, Democratic Kampuchea's Constitution establishes neu­
trality among the attributes of the nation ; a position difficult to maintain credibly 
if the party openly announeces its control. In all, however, the internal arguments 
for continued clandestine control seem most convincing. As the internal situation 
ripens with the education of cadre and the lessening need for tight internal secur­
ity, the Communist Party of Kampuchea will undoubtedly publicly enter the interna­
tional circle of fraternal communist parties. 
116Ith Sarin, "Nine Months,e" p. 12. 
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MANIFESTO OF THE PERIODICAL 
REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN 
(From Yuvaehu n Nung 
Yuvaneari Padevat, 
No. 1 ,  August 1973, 
pp. 1-7.  ) 
In our revolutionary movement today a great many young men and women have ac­
tively sought to j oin together in both the Alliance of Yuv . K . K .  [Communist Youth of 
Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizationso. And these numbers are continually growing 
in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of the Alliance of 
Yuv . K . K .  counts by tens of thousands of people .o. In the offices and departments there 
are tens of thousands of young men and womeno. In the armed forces of all three cate­
gories (village militia,  regional forces, regular forces) there are also a great many 
young men and womeno. Therefore, if we add them together all over the country , the 
number of young men and women in our revolutionary ranks adds to hundreds of thou­
sands of people, whether Yuv . K . K . ,  troops, in offices and departments both at the 
front lines and the rear rankso. 
In sum, all young men and women in ou� revolutionary ranks have all received 
continuous constructive education from the party. Therefore , so far, the movement 
of young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual and 
in building a movement of revolutionary struggleo. Our many young men and women have 
j oined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front lines and 
1n rear areas in overflowing numbers.  
In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater 
strength in accordance with the actual situation , in ·oaccordance with our revolution­
ary movement which is bounding ahead , our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even though 
pressed by other matters , nevertheless definitely needed to build an organ to edu­·o
cate-construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political consciousness in our 
young men and women following the direction and the policy approach of the party in 
order that [this principle] becomes more clearly definedo. That organ is this peri­
odical Revolutionary Young Men and Women which appears monthlyo. This periodical is 
an organ of revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of the party . .  
The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and· 
women, taken together, but also · to serve all progressive young men and women in the 
ranks, tooo. This periodical has a direction toward building our young meno's  and 
womeno' s  political consciousness and their implementation of assignments which will 
serve the movement to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas as well 
as in the offices and departmentso. 
Therefore ,  this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the move­
ment of young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the prin­
ciple of political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organiza­
tion and to acquire [for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in the 
matter of political consciousness and regarding the j ob of implementing various 
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assignments of the revolutionary youth organization. That is to say, [this periodi­
cal]e: 
1 .  Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political prin­
ciples, strategic and tactical; the approach to people's war of the party; the 
party's economic approach; the party's socio-cultural approach and the p�rty's
foreign policy goals through concrete execution and with concrete experience 
of building the force of revolutionary young men and women. 
2. Mentally, aims to di�seminate, construct, nurture a revolutionary con­
sciousness such as: 
-- class consciousness, class struggle, division into classes so that our 
youth have a proper class philosophy; 
righteous revolutionary precepts; 
national pride, a proper patriotic spirit. Proletarian nationalism and 
internationalism of our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national 
principles of the worker class, of the party; 
-- precepts of unremitting struggle both with the enemy and with nature and 
in building oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party 
assigns in order to have maximum victory; 
-- a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the 
base areas; 
-- a revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front 
lines, in increasing production in the rear areas, in fulfilling duties well 
in offices, etc. 
-- a high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests 
in favor of the whole, etc. 
3.  In implementing assignments, aims to: 
At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combat­
tants, who are messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the 
wounded, etc.e, to overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties 
to the maximum; to fight and strive as strongly as possible and always firmly. 
In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; 
the problem of solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a 
job with the people of the basese: 
-- increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to 
the people of the bases; 
-- exploding the spirit of the collectivity; spirit of economizing of col­
lective goods and of time in the offices and departments and worksites and 
individual jobs. 
In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the over­
all good and increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that 
is to say, changing their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption of a 
new, revolutionary worldview as a replacement. 
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To summarize, the periodical RevoZuetiona;r,y Young Men and Women has a direction 
toward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assign­
ments of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that it be­
comes increasingly vigorous and strong - in the interest of serving the movement to 
fight and strive onward both at the front l ines and in the rear areas. It also 
builds reserve strength for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionary move­
ment generally in the future by taking the revolutionary movement concretely, both 
at the front l ines and in the rear areas and. offices , and building it by means of 
the aspects of political consciousness and the task of implementing variouse_eassign­
ments. 
Therefore,  the periodical RevoZuetiona:.t>y Young Men and Women appeals to our 
dear readers to provide their personal assistance in news and many articles of vari­
ous personal experiences to be printed in our periodical. 
In conclusion, the periodical RevoZuetiona:ry Young Men and Women wishes success 
to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea, wishes good health and strength and a 
quick intel l igence as well as a strong principle of revolutionary political conscious­
ness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive against the enemy on 
all fronts to be as strong as possible and continual ly gain new great victories! 
Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea ! 
Long Live the periodical RevoZutionary Young Men and Women! 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA 
AND THE PROBLEM OF 
KHMER YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN 
(From Yuvachun Nung 
Yuvaneari Padevat 
No. 1 ,  August 1973, 
pp . 9-20.  ) 
We raise this problem in order 
-- that our youth might clearly understand the philosophy, principles, and 
activities of the oppressor classes which are imperilaist, feudal, capitalist, and 
whose beliefs affect our youth; 
-- that our youth might clearly understand the philosophy, principles, and 
activities of our Khmer Communist Party as concerns the youth of Kampuchea (Cambodia). 
These desires aim to gather the strength of youth whether revolutionary farmer , 
worker, student, or intellectual for ever-increasing and closer solidarity with the 
nation, people, and armed forces for the liberation of the Khmer nation through 
fighting a peoples' war against American imperialists and their valets; fighting to 
liquidate the traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In  Tam and their clique; 
and struggling to wrest genuine independence, peace, and neutrality to build so that 
our beloved country becomes happy, bountiful, glorious, and powerful. That is the 
high ideal of our people, especially our youth who are the guarantors of, who have 
the responsibility for, the future destiny of the nation and people under the leader­
ship of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 
* * * 
Human society is divided into social classes: there is the oppressor class 
and the oppressed. In  Khmer society, for example, each class has its own different 
economic and political interests. Therefore, each social class has a philosophy, 
principles, and activities specific to each problem, large or small, and different 
from other classes. 
The oppressor class is imperialistic, feudal and capitalist in seeking to pro­
tect its own interests; it has a philosophy, principles and a mentality [or conscious­
ness] such that [we] see the facts of aggression against other countries and the 
oppression of the worker-farmer class and the people described as "just" or "proper" 
etc. 
The former French imperialism and the present American imperialism which has 
invaded and is oppressing our nation, people, and youth, which is bombing and slaugh­
tering our people and youth in the most ferocious, violent way, both have said that 




The traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam and their clique is a 
mileitarist, fascist representative for the feudal, capitalist, and unparalleled reac­
tionary class that serves as traitorous, country-selling valets of American imperial­
ists. [The clique] opened its arms to American imperialists and to the Saigon/Bangkok 
traitors, shot and slaughtered the people and youth at will. As for them, they are 
corrupt fascists who seize youth and take them to be shot at in their place. They 
usually claim that they are "patriots,e" "saving the nation,e" "freedom-loving and 
democratic" and are"developing the country,e" etc. 
The Khmer nation which is .paying by the loss of its soi1 and independence; the 
Khmer people and youth, who are paying by the loss of liberty, democracy, their 
future, and who are oppressed by the American imperialists and the traitorous group,
have a clear philosophy and principles that definitely require struggle to wrest 
independence, democracy, and their own future under the leadership of the Khmer Com­
munist party. A struggle must take place in order to liberate the nation and people 
and youth; only then will progress be made toward building a plentiful, glorious and 
powerful nation. 
The problem of youth is analogous. The imperialist, feudal, capitalist oppres­
sor class, which has interests glued to aggression and oppression, also has its 
philosophy, principles, and activities toward youth in accord with its class interest. 
The Communist Party of Kampuchea, the party of the working class, represents 
the interests of the worker-farmer class, of the people, and represents the interests 
of the nation and youth; [the party] also has a philosophy, principles, and activi­
ties which follow those of the nation, people, and classes which it represents. 
What are the phiZosophy; principles, and activities of the imperiaZist, feudal, 
aapitalist alass toward the youth of our Kampuchea? 
For a long time the imperialist, feudal, capitalist oppressor class has re­
garded youth, especially worker-farmer youth, poor and lower-middle peasants, as a 
source from which they can suck out their interests in the most delicious manner and 
as a major source of strength to perpetuate their oppression and protect their trea­
sonous state power. 
Imperialists, in their aggression against any country, whether in the guise of 
old or neo-colonialism, must try all methods, of whatever shape or form, to get the 
youth in hand. They transform youth into important instruments of theirs in execut­
ing their colonial policy. During wartime, youth is a source which imperialists 
first of al l seize and force to go to be shot at and die in their place. Manifestly, 
American imperialists and the traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam 
now are using fascist laws to herd our youth like cattle into taking up arms, fight­
ing and dying in their place. 
The feudal, capitalist cl�ss is just the same. Youth, whether poor or lower 
middle peasant are exploited by feudal landowners through rents for fields, interest 
on money, all of which unite to create sorrow, difficulty, and suffering [for them] 
along with [their] fathers, mothers, and families. When they no longer have paddies 
or fields and must go to the cities, then the capitalists heavily oppress the worker 
forces. Salaries are not commensurate with the heavy work so food is never enough 
to satisfy hunger. Sometimes the capitalists chase them out of the factories and 
they can find no work; some youths are forced to fall into evil ways. 
As for students and genuine intellectuals, they are not as oppressed as worker­
farmers and poor and lower middle peasants and others. However, their education is 
conducted according to an imperialist, feudal, and capitalist culture to transform 
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them into young men and women who have lost all patriotic spirit, love of the people, 
and love of production. Imperialists, feudalists, and capitalists change our student 
youth and intellectuals to become their instruments to serve them in perpetuating 
their treasonous state power. 
Our young people in their youth are comparable to flowers which are budding 
and brilliantly blossoming. But, in the society of the oppressor class, our youth 
of all strata are withered and blighted, stifled and muffled, in difficulty and suf­
fering, because of the oppressors' wickedness and because of the threats and intimi­
dation of the fascist, despoti� regime of the oppressors. The future of our youth 
1s black, null. 
What is the Communist Pa;rity of Kampuchea's philosophy, principles, and 
activities regarding our youth? 
As the party of the workers and the representative of the interests of the 
worker-farmer class and of the people and representative of the interests of the 
nation and youth, the Communist Party of Kampuchea regards Khmer youth as a major
and important strength of the nation which has the most essential role in the strug­
gle to liberate the nation now and in the future construction of the nation. 
A nation which has a youth strong in revolutionary consciousness and revolu­
tionary political principles, and which has been made strong and solid under the 
leadership of the party of the working class, the nation, and people, will surely 
win over every enemy aggressor and surely will have a glorious, powerful future in 
plenty and happiness. 
From the earliest times until now, under the leadership, training, and care of 
the party, Khmer youth of all strata, especially farmer-worker, student youth, have 
joined together in every era to fight and make a revolution to free the nation and 
liberate the people. 
In the era of struggle to wrest independence from French colonialism, our party 
caused the movement to explode; youth joined in large scale and became combattants, 
doctors, supply transporters, producers, etc. 
In the political struggle from 1954 to 1967, the party increasingly concen­
trated on education and building the strength of youth and people in the rural areas 
and in the cities. Khmer youth, upon receiving this education in the political prin­
ciples, the revolutionary consciousness of the party, all found rage strongly mount­
ing. [Their rage] manifested itself as a struggle movement to contest American 
imperialists and the oppressor classes in whatever guise. In the cities, especially 
in Phnom Penh, the force of youth, that is, worker-producer and student youth, became 
the nucleus, the wick of the struggle in the movement of demonstrateions and meetings 
to oppose American imperialists and the traitorous power-holders. In rural areas 
the party also depended on the strength of youth, whether poor or lower middle peas­
ants. The party protected, educated and developed them to awaken and become aware 
of the national problem, the class problem, and to entrust them with the study as 
defense forces for the protection of villages (Phum) and districts (Khum) and their 
officials (Committees) ; to destroy spies of the ferocious traitors, and to str_uggle
only to change the life of poor farmers. 
In the era of political struggle, even though our party had difficulties in 
educating [propagandizing] youth of all strata, the party tried to use all means 
whether open or secret. Our party educated youth by word of mouth alone, by legal 
public newspapers and issued secret [clandestine] periodicals such as the periodical 
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Yuvachun Chhean Mukh ("Progressive Youth") and the periodical Kamnokar (' 'Worker") 
for workers in general as well as for young workers. 
Because of receiving a progressive and revolutionary ideology from the party, 
the revolutionary struggle movement of youth surged increasingly stronger in both 
the cities and the rural areas and united with the movements of the people as a whole 
under the leadership of the party. Which is to say in the combat movement of youth 
which the party began in 1962, the secret youth organization called the Sampoan 
Yuvachun Kampuchea Praaheathibodey ("Alliance of Democratic Khmer Youth") which later 
came to be called the Sampotm Yuvaahun Korronunis Kampuchea ("Alliance of Communist Youth 
of Kampuchea"), became the right arm of the party under the direct aegis of the party. 
In the era of internal armed struggle during the two years since the American 
imperialists and traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tarn coup to date, 
tens, hundreds of thousands of brave Khmer youth have responded to the party's appeal 
and stood forth to make revolutionary war to deal with American imperialists and the 
traitors. They have unreservedly joined the revolutionary ranks, j oined to serve 
the revolution bravely in all tasks of the party. The revolutionary struggle will 
end in great victory now. 
From the time the movement appeared until now, in every era of the Khmer na­
tion's and peoplee' s  struggle under the party's leadership, we have clearly se�n that 
the party ·has educated, watched, nourished, and built youth as thee·ecentral force in 
the revolutionary movement of each era and as the central force for future national 
construction. This is a glorious honor for Khmer youth which must take its turn, 
make the revolution until final victory under the leadership of the party, and then 
continue the revolution in the position which youth itself will have as the masters 
of the future destiny of the nation. 
* * * 
On the glorious occasion of issuing the periodical Yuvachun-Yuvaneari Padevat 
("Revolutionary Young Men ande· woman"), we al1 have the deepest appr·eciation for the 
important role of the young men and women of Kampuchea in each era of the revolu­
tionary movement. We also wish to pause in reflection as a sign of respect for the 
valorous sacrifices of brave Khmer youth. They have sacrificed for the end of liber­
ating the nation, people, and class. We will always remember this heroism and these 
good deeds done for the nation, people, and party. 
Ith Sarin 
NINE MONIBS WITH THE MAQUIS 
(Translation from the 
Frenah by U.S.  Embassy, 
Phnom Penh, May 19?3 . )  
En Route 
On April 19, 1972, at Tonle Bati, we were received by officers of a Khmer Rouge 
battalion commanded by a former primary schoolteacher who had disappeared from Phnom 
Penh in 1970. 
On April 20, at Barset (Kg. Speu) we were presented to the President of the 
Srok Committee (the equivalent of the Aphibalsrok) named HAM (a revolutionary name). 
He was a former primary teacher at the primary school of Santhor Mok, disappeared 
from Phnom Penh in 1966. He was about 40 robust, short, stocky, bald and taciturn. 
On May 6, at Veal Loveang, in Phong District (Kg. Speu) we received a visit 
from NONG SUON (called Chamroeun Chey), Political Commissar of the Saang-Koh Thorn 
Region (Damban No. 25). He was about 40, tall, with a sonorous voice, bronze com­
plexion and one broken tooth. 
On May 10: a mass meeting in the grounds of the primary school of Kat Phlouk 
which grouped more than 10 thousand men. Khmer Rouge cadres of the province and the 
srok were present. Mr. SAING RIM (called On), a former Professor of the Deuxierne 
Cycle was president of the organizing committee. Mr. HOU YON [usually spelled HOU 
YUON] gave a two-hour speech which was much applauded. 
At the Head uarters of the Khmer Rou (Tactical Region 
No. 305). District ·of Peam Pram Bei Ttalach 
On May 14, around 1700, at Taing Khmau, we were received by Mr. SIENG PO SE in 
person, at the time he was Chief of the Regional Supply and a Finance Service. His 
Deputy Mr. MEN NITHO (called Dan), a former Electrical Engineer was with him. Mr. 
Sieng Po Se (called Neak), was about 40, average height, yellow complexion almost 
Chinese. As for his number two, Men Nitho was about 30, average height, bronze com­
plexion, and purely Khmer. 
On May 15 at Sieng Po Se's camp, we were visited by a number of people: CHHUN 
SOK NGUON (called Som) former engineer of public works, accompanied by SIENG TEK 
CHHAY (ex-professor of ESPC)1 and by DIEN PHIKAR (former primary teacher)e. All were 
in the regional service of Information and Propaganda. 
SOK THUOK (called Vorn) Chief of the Khmer Rouge Special Region and Vice-Minis­
ter of Security in GRUNK. Mr. Sok Thuok, known under the revolutionary name of Vorn, 
was thin, feeble, average height, cooper complexion, open utterer of tightly delivered 
1Enseignement secondaire du premier cycle, a secondary school teacher. 
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wordse. He was about 40 and was a member of the Central Committee of the Khmer Commu­
nist Party [PKK]e. Within the Party he held a higher rank than Hou Yuon and Hou Nim. 
HOU YUON coming on a tour of inspection in the regione: He was named Minister 
of the Interior, charged with Community Development and Cooperativese. Hou Yuon was 
about 40, robust, solid, tall, copper complected, of a jovial temperament , very open 
_but close and combative, d_eeply cultured and politicized. A good leader of men , he 
rejoiced in guerrilla life .  His popularity among his comrades and the inhabitants 
was uncontestede. It was to exploit this popularity and his political credit to the 
maximum that NUFK and the Party Central Committee offered him the honorific portfolio 
of the Interior. Actually, Hou Yuon has no real authority within the Party. His 
party comrades tended to accuse him of revisionism because his materialistic revolu­
tionary concepts were less rigid, more supple, and more l iberale. 
THUCH RIN (called Krin), former professor, member of the Party, Director of the 
regional service of Information and Propaganda for the Nirdey Teuse2 Regione. He· was 
Director and Editor in Chief of the information newspaper Praaheaahon Padevat [Revolu­
tionary People]e. He_ is  one of the more important poleitical personalities of the 
Nirdey Teus Regione. Aged about 30, round, shorter than average height, with a wide 
forehead and copper complexion, he was open and affablee. 
On 21 May, during a dinner organi zed in honor of Hou Yuon , we met : NGUON ENG 
(called Ny) Sethakech Pet [a member of the hospital team] ,  former engineer, member 
of the Party . He was about 40, copper complexion, taciturn, and about the same 
heieght as Hou Yuone. 
Mr . HANG (revolutionary name) : small, active, open , eloquent, he was about 30 
and about 1. 59 meters tal 1. A member of the. Party, he was the Deputy to Sok Thuok 
and the only person of importance in the region whom we could not identeify. His 
wife was a schoolteacher. 
KOY OUM (cal led T .  P .  [sia] ) 3 from the Railway Service at Phnom Penh, he ralleied 
to the Khmer Rouge movement in February 1972e. He was in the Khmer Rouge supply ser­
vice for the Red Armies of Nirdey Teuse. He was about 40, bald, plump, courteous, 
affable, and j oviale. 
ROS CHETHO (called Cheat) was about 1 . 66 or 1 . 67 meters tal l ,  with round pierc­
ing eyes , bulging forehead,  receding hairline, and a pensive aire. He was a slow and 
sonorous speaker and was about 38 or 39e. He was the third-ranking political person­
ality of the Special Region after Mre. Hang.e. He was a Party member and Director of 
the Information and Propaganda Service for the Special Regione. 
From 26 May to 3 June 1972 : A political meeting of intellectuals of the 
Special Region was held .  It was organized by the Phnom Penh NUFK Committee and pre­
sided over by Prince Phurissara and Hou Yuon . Some 60 intellectuals attended . 
The Phnom Penh Committee 
-
i s  thusly constituted : 
Prince PHURISSARA (called Kem) President 
Doctor CHUON CHOEUN (called Pen) Vice President 
ROS CHETHO Member, Charged with 
Press and Information 
2southweste. 
3Koy Ourn ' s  revolutionary name is  Tip 1n Sranaoh Pralung Khmer, p .  2 8 .  
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PHOK CHHAY4 Member, Charged with Trade Unions 
Mme. KHIEU PONNARY Member, representing the 
Association of Patriotic Womene5 
Only Mme. Khieu Ponnary was missing from this meeting. 
Besides the members of the Phnom Penh NUFK Committee the following people 
attended the meeting : 
DY PHON (called Thuk), dentist. Nyopic, jovial, and a talker. Yellow complex-
ion, about 40 and plump. 
HANG (deputy to Sok Thuok) 
CHEY CHUM (High Functionary) recently come from Phnom Penh. He joined the 
meeting May 27  and probably had left Phnom Penh the 26th May 1972. Thin, sickly, 
tall, he was almost SO. In his black outfit he looked Vietnamesee,. a PHAN VAN DONG ! 
SIENG PO SE 
MEN NITHO 
THUCH RIN 
CHHUN SOK NGUON (called Som), a young engineer, aged 32e, member of the Party. 
CHAN BOPHA (called Khom), holds a Licence in law, former magistrate. Respon­
sible for the Office of Sale of Imported Goods. He is  about 30, tall and slim. 
Miss KUN (revolutionary name), a former professor of the Second Cycle. Age: 
28 or 29, petite, modest and discreet. A member of the Party, she will have 1ncreas-
1ng influence. 
KAING KEK !EV (former professor ESPC) , small, thin, il 1. 
KHIEK VANTHA (former Controller of Finance) died of illness toward the end of 
June. 
YOU THAN (called Phal)e, former professor ESPC, member of the Party. 
SIEK TEK CHHAY (called Than) 
SREY DAUNG (called Khe), former dam engineer, more than 27 years old, 
good-looking, intelligent and eloquent. 
DIEN PHIKAN (fonner schoolteacher) 
Mrs. CHUON CHOEUN and her daughter 
KHIENG KAON (professor) 
4Sranaoh Pralung Khmer, p. 31, puts Nguon Eng in charge of Trade Unions, and 
makes Phok Chhay the representative of Students and Intellectuals. 
5Association of Democratic Women in  Sranaoh Pralung Khmer, p. 31. 
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(3) 
PHOK CHHAY, member of the Party, - thin, about. 38 or 39 years old. He was in 
fragile health and of average height, a good orator with a very good memory. 
CHUON CHOEUN, About 48 or 49, bald, sparse hair, plump .e. 
Prince PHURISSARA, age about 40, bronze complexion, average height; wide·, 
bulgi ng forehead; modest , simple, and courteous. 
On 12 November 1972, we made a furtive visit to newcomers Mr. SO MERAM, naval 
captai n (capitaine de vaiss�au) and his two Lieutenants. It is to  be noted that 
officers who rally to NUFK such as Messrs SO MERAM, MAING MARINEL and CHENG SAYUMBAUN 
are viewed with a jaundiced eye. 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA 
Party veterans pretended that their revolutionary movement was born in  1951, 
at first under the name of the Peoplee' s  Party (Kanapak Pracheachon)e. It was only 
later (we forget the date) that the Pracheachon was called the "Communist Party of 
Kampuchea.e" I n  the beginning of 1972, the Central Committee of the Party published 
the history of 21  years of struggle of their party, a struggle which was -fought from 
1951 to 1972. Tactically, this struggle went on in  three steps: 
(1) From 1951 to 1954 (until the general peace treaty of Geneva), the Cambo­.e
dian Communists conducted a joint political and armed struggle (according 
to their words, alas ! ) .  They claimed that their Party controlled 2/5 of 
the land and two million people at that timee. But the Treaty of Geneva 
obliged them to hand in  their arms and cede the conquered lands to neu­
tralist forces, to cooperate with the regime in  power, and to limit their 
activities solely to the political struggle. Mr. Hou Yuon, during the 
26 May meeting remarked: 
"The socialist powers of Europe, bloodied by the Second World War, 
and the Asian socialists, much weakened by the Chinese and Korean wars, 
overesteimated the strength of the imperialists at that moment and pres­
sured the all-consuming Indochinese revolutionary forces to end the 
fighting and accept the peace treaty with the imperialist forces.e" Hou 
Yuon saw in  this a calculated tactical maneuver by the socialists. 
(2) From 1954 to 1967, the political struggle: by means of the press, in  
Parliament, in  the various quasi-governmental institutions. In continuing 
its political struggle, the PKK launched preparations for another armed 
struggle. Intellectual cadree.ewere repeatedly sent to the maquis to form 
combat cells. The clandestine disappearance of young intellectuals ex­
plains this tactic of the party. 
From 1967, the Party resumed the armed struggle. The events at Samlaut 
were prepared in  advance and gave new impulse to  the struggle. 
The Khmer Communist Party, ·which had disguised itself for long years, showed 
its true face from 30 September 1972. It proclaimed its existence from 1951 and its 
rights of leadership through all vicissitudes of the struggle. It took the direct-ion 
of the struggle in  the framework of the NUFK. The open inauguration of the 21st 
anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which took place 30 September 1972, 
gave the first public view of the party flag which has as emblems a haJilliler and sickle 
in the center of a blood-red field. 
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Mr. SALOTH SAR was Secretary-General of the Party. After came IENG SARY, KHIEU 
SAMPHAN, SON SEN. We were unable to secure a list of members of the Party Central 
Commiettee.e6 What we know is that Hou ·Yuon and Hu Nim were second-rank personages 
in the Central Committee of the Party. All the Chiefs of the five tactical Regions 
(Nirdey Teus, Special Region, Bopea Teus, Oddor Teus, Central Region)e7 were both 
Vice-Ministers and members of the Party Central Committee. 
ORGANIZATIONe**  PROGRAM 
The former administrative structure has been modified. The administrative 
hierarchy was as follows: the Phum, the Khum, the Srok, the Damban, the Region, the 
Central Committee. Each zone is administered by a committee assisted by various 
associations: Patriotic Youth Association, Association of Young Democrats (molding 
the cells of the party), Association of Patriotic Women . . e. .  The number of members 
of the committee varies with the importance of the zone. The committee is composed 
of a President, a Vice-President, members charged with supply and the economy, in­
struction and education, health services, etc. All the Presidents of the NUFK Com­
mittees for Sroks, Damban, and Regions are members of the Party and cell-leaders; so 
are most of the leaders of NUFK Committees for Khums. The Khum Commiettees which do 
not have the Party's trust are flanked by one or two representatives of the Party. 
Such is the case for the Khum Commiettee of Tbeng Khpos.e8 As for Phums, the party 
leaves them to the desires of pro-Sihanouk elements. 
The forces are arranged in  three categories: village guerrilla (Kang ChhZop) ,  
the regional army (Kang Damban), and the regular army (Kang Sruoch)e. Regular cadre 
are picked from Party cells. 
From company level, the commander of each unit is helped by a Political Commis­
sar whose authority over combatants is indisputable. The Party seeks to give command 
over each unit to sons of peasants, sympathizers and faithful to the movemente. 
The Communist Party of Kampuchea published the political program of the NUFK 
which it elaborated together with Sihanouk's team in Peking. The major political 
l ines followed by Sihanouk when he was in  power remain almost the same . There are 
some modifications regarding internal policies. As for foreign policy, there is no 
change: Cambodia is to be neutral, independent, non-aligned, territorial integrity, 
cooperation internationally on terms of equality with all countries regardless of 
regime. 
One feels Sihanouk's political world 1n this program; however, the term "mon­
archy" has passed into silence. 
One could say that the political program of the NUFK is far from being advan­
tageous for the PKK. There is only mentioned in detail an enlarged action plan to 
improve the life of little people, peasants and workers; intensified rural develop­
ment, more rational agricultural policy, workers' salaries, social insurance, farming 
policy, war policy, etc . . .  
6Sranaoh PraZung Khmer, p. 43, adds the following: Koy Thuon, Deputy Finance 
Minister; Hu Nim, Minister of Information; Tiv 01 , Deputy Minister of Information; 
Hou Yuon, Minister of Interior; Khieu Ponnary, Deputy Minister of Education, etc. ; 
Chou 
Doeus
Chet, Deputy Minister 
komar, Deputy Foreign 
of Health; Sok Thuok, Deputy 
Minister. 
Minister of Security; Pok 
7Teus means "direction" and the word preceding is a compass point. 
8 A srok of Oudong Meanchey Province. 
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This NUFK political program was elaborated in Peking toward the middle of 1970 
at the time when the Khmer Communist Party had to cut its fingers to exploit Siha­
nouko' s  political credit. This iso. nothing but a communist trick. Now, in the inter­
nal areas, this plan is a dead letter. The Khmer Communist Party, in methodically 
getting rid of pro-Sihanouk cadres, has carte bZanche over the direction of the 
country. Under the veil of NUFK and with the complicity of the Chinese and Viet­
namese Communist parties, it has followed and respected only its own program not as 
yet revealed to the public. 
In accelerating the development of its cadres, the Party has undertaken efforts 
at colloectivization at its rear baseso: common storehouses, paddies, small groups of 
villagers living in collectivity. All these actions try to awaken a socialist con­
sciousness among the peasants. 
But the peasants remain passive, very attached to their habits and customs. 
The new collective life being imposed on them frightens them. Most keep secret their 
attachment to Sihanouk and his regime. 
Sihanouk has practically no power. All power is and will be in the hands of 
the Party. If Sihanouk wishes to cling to power and his former regime, he will be 
simply eliminated. The Sihanouk-KR9 coalition is clearly a fraud. NUFK is nonsense 
because of its deep and irreconcilable contradictionso. Now, the first task of the 
PKK consists of indoctrinating and assimilating pro-Sihanouk forceso. An accelerated 
formation of cadres so requires. 
Vis-a-vis North Vietnam, the PKK is in close cooperation, but less favorable 
than with Red China. There is· also distrust of North Vietnamese unstated intentionso. 
Hou Yuon said that the PKK has foreseen all in preparing for danger from the VC/NVA .  
Certain Party cadres declare unceasingly that the key to the Vietnamese problem (the 
victory of Vietnamese socialism, reunification) can be found in Cambodiao. It is 
therefore in the interest of the VC/NVA (interest of all sorts, moreover ! )  that they 
support the PKK. Alas ! The PKK brags of being up to its mission ; it is absolutely 
not under the guidance of the Vietnamese Communist Party; it is equal to all frater­
nal Communist parties and independent. 
The PKK seems to have control over all activities in its zones. The VC/NVA 
are far from being the masters. 
The PKK tends to sympathize more with Red China. It sees there a constant 
support, efficacious and disinterested. It has modeled its leadership after the 
Chinese. It should likewise be noted that most of the higher cadres of the Party 
are pro-Chinese socialists. The Party also sees in China a counterweight to the 
Vietnamese dangero. 
Unlike China, the PKK does not deal gently with the Soviet Communists. Like 
China, it has accused the USSR of revisionismo. 
It has kept a mortalo.ohate for the Republican Government of Phnom Penh. It 
accuses it of being the valet of American imperialists, of being puppets, of being 
reactionary, of corruptiono. 
It has tried to instill  a bloody hate against our regime among the masses 
(meetings, artistic seances, popular gatherings). 
9Khmer Rouge. 
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In  my opinion, we have very little chance in appealing for the collaboration 
of the KR with our regime. 
PARTY CADRES, CRITICISM, SELF-CRITICISM, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 
The development of Party cadres is an almost continuous process (at school, in 
daily life, in meetings and informal l ectures) '. 
At school there are deb�tes and conferences on the contents of various docu-
ments recommended by the Party Central Committee, for examplee: 
Revolutionary discipline 
The National Revoluteion 
Social Classes in Cambodian Society 
Class Struggle. Antagonistic Contradicti9ns 
Popular Conception [ "Z.a conception popuZ.aire "] 
The Directing Role of the Working Class in the Revolutionary Struggle 
Revoleutionary Hate 
The Proletarianization of Cadres: The Qualities of a Revolutionary Cadre 
How to Fight Individualism, Liberalism, Dogmatism, Opportunism, Sectarianism, 
etc. 
The Price of a Revoleutionary 
Collectivism, Criticism, Self-Criticism, etc. 
Practically and in daily life, each member has the duty of checking on his 
fellow man. This duty is reciprocal. A l l  which is not revolutionary or which is 
harmful to the revolution (socialist revolution) is co"demnable, forbidden (listening 
to broadcasts of songs from Phnom Penh is forbidden)e. Each member is required to 
undergo manual tests like workers or peasants (digging, wood-cutting, vegetable grow­
ing, rice-mil ling, transplanting, etc. ) . . . .  These manual tests are an integral 
part of the formation of revolutionary cadres. In  short, each member should be like 
the people, with the people, for the people . . . .  
Cadres in training must have two meetings each week, the first in a small group 
of which they are members, the other in the group as a whole. In  the closed group� 
one practices criticism and selef-criticism directly. In turn, each member examines 
himself, his own activities and his errors in the past week before passing under the 
criticism of his comradese. The criticisms and selef-criticisms ought to be done on 
the five following recommended principles : 
manual activities 
state of morale, feelings 
instructions given by higher-ranking chiefs 
personal position regarding policy and the Party 
revolutionary solidarity 
Criticism and self-criticism are practiced at all echelons and social strata. 
In the group as a whole, one·criticizes the group's collective activities 
without alluding to individual activities. Afterwards the group develops a program 
of collective work for the forthcoming week. 
The PKK seems faithful to the chief Marxist-Leninist l ines. Certain concrete 
realities of Cambodian society have been voluntarily forgotten. For example, Khmer 
individualism is solidly rooted in Khmer society and forms the base of the national 
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personality. Buddhism {combatted by the spirit of Khmer Marxist materialism) is  
similarly inseparable from the social and national life of the Khmer. 
The collectivization preached by the KR will be checked when confronted with 
the instinctive individualism of the Khmer. The proof is  that" the peasants in  the 
KR rear base at Peam Pram Bei Mom are successively withdrawing from the collective 
life imposed on them. 
Vis-a-vis the movement of international peace, the PKK has kept its intransi­
gent position: no negotiations, no peaceful political settlement. They have fought 
to the bitter end the possibility of peaGe negotiations with our government, with 
our regime. They have unceasingly proclaimed control over 8/lOths of the territory 
and five million people. Their decisive victories are just in  sight. They reject 
any peaceful political settlement. 
As for general elections, they have no ideas. 
But, personally, I think that in  case of inevitable general elections, imposed 
by the great powers, i ncluding China, the PKK already has its knight: Sihanouk. 
But this i s  only an illusion. I think that, even under the pressure of great powers, 
the PKK will continue the fight, will reject the general election because it  will be 
more advantageous for our regime or for Sihanouk than for them. 
CONCLUSION 
1. I believe that the people, peasants living under enemy control, do not 
want the socialist regime, nor the presence of VC/NVA. Loving their land and vil­
lage, they wish ardently for the return of peace. 
The greater part of those attached to Sihanouk have more and more lost hope in  
his return to power and are turning to our regime. All in  continuing the fight 
against the Communists, we should, in our opinion, expose actively the deep contra­
dictions between Sihanouk and the PKK. We have every chance to attract to our cause 
the Sihanoukists who tremble before the weight of the red regime. 
2. To carry on the war against the Communists, the best tactic consists, I 
think, in  rationalizing and cleaning up our own adminiestration, in  resolving the 
major immediate internal problems (the economy for example), in  restoring discipline 
and the revolutionary ardor of March 18. Because Communism i s  recognized by the 
masses as a regime both inconceivable and incompatible with the national society, 
there is  still time for our regime to reexamine frankly, with no suspicious passions, 
our past errors, errors which cost our regime, however much still applauded and 
loved, dear. 
Done at Phnom Penh, 7 May 1973 
Mr. Ith Sarin, ex-Inspector of 
Primary Schools 
Ith Sarin 
LIFE IN THE BUREAUS (OFFICES) 
OF THE KHMER ROUGE 
(3 JUNE 1972 TO 15 JA�UARY 1973) 
(From his Sranaoh Pralung 
Khmer [Regrets for the 
KflJTler Soul] , Phnom Penh, 
1973, pp. 37-76 . )  
On 3 June 1972 the Angkar ["Organization"] ordered us to work in the Bureau of 
Information and Culture of the Special Region. Comrade (Mit) Chhun Sok Nguon, a 
former engineer, was Chairman of the Bureau of Information of the Special Region re­
placing Mr. Chi Kim An who hanged himself in the beginning of April. He took us to 
work in Phum Srei Andoung. Our office was built on a high elevation at an old aban­
doned village 500 meters west of Wat Srei Andoung next to the Kok Kmaoch [of Srei 
Andoung]e. When we arrived the other members were interested and paid us close atten­
tion. Our group (krwn) had 13 members, most of whom were engineers and teaching
personnel; all were under the command of Mr. Ros Chetthor himself. Mr. Ros Chettor 
was the third-ranking personality in the Special Region following after Comrade Sok 
Thuok and Comrade Hang. The Bureau Chairman explained about the Organization's 
discipline, about the collective lifestyle, about the duties which we must daily 
accomplish. The 13 members were divided into three teams (buak)e. The Chairman of 
the Bureau designated those colleagues who were most sincere toward the Organization. 
They had the strongest political principles and could become chairmen of the teams. 
Each team must meet weekly to examine each other ' s  principles; they called thi� the 
"Lifestyle Meeting" or the meeting for criticism and self-criticism .  They decided 
on Thursday night for ' Team meetings" and on Sunday night for the "Group meeting" or 
the gathering of all the teams. 
1. Location and Situation 
Each bureau had to be built far from peasant villages; near a source of water, 
a stream or a well, for example; in a thick wood and close to open fields. They 
built thatch huts under large trees. One hut was for sleeping, another for dining,. 
and various others for working. The Information Bureau of the Special Region had a 
printing press, typewriter, mimeograph� stencils, ink, various documents· , etc. Near 
the work area they dug a bunker and many little trenches to take shelter in during 
bombing attacks. All members, including the old and the young, could recognize 
various makes of aircraft by their sound. On hearing a distant sound, the 10 year­
olds instantly could tell an observation craft from a T-28 bomber. 
The bureaus of the important administrative committees (kammabhipal) were built 
in the quiet woods at a distance of 500 to 1 , 500 meters from small villages which 
were support villages or their base camps. By observation, their location was often 
in thick woods near very small rice fields so as to remain concealed from aircraft 
and so breezes could easily circulate. 
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The Communist Party of Kampuchea has divided the areas they hold into larger 
regions as followso: 
1) Southwest Region which includes Kampot and Koh Kong provinces ; Sihanouk­
ville; Kompong Seila, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang, Kompond Speu, 0udong, and Kandal prov­
inces. 
2) Eastern Regions which includes Kratie, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and Kompong 
Cham provinces. 
3) Northwest Region has Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, 0ddar Meanchey, and Banteay 
Chhmar provinces. 
4) Pursat-Battambang-Pailin provinces. 
5) Special Region (newly created at the end of 1971) to control the area around 
Phnom Penh. Today the Special Region, both headquarters and internal administration, 
are located in the Southwest Region on the Kompong Speu-Koinpong Chhnang border in 
·the Sangkat [a lower administrative division] of Peam Prambei Mom, the southern sec­
tion of the District (srok) of Kompong Tralacho. Some of its administrative personnel 
are in Kompong Speu province (Srok Baset) and in Kanda! province (Srok Kandal Stung 
and Srok Saang-Koh Thom). 
6) Preah Vihear province, Stung Treng, Mondulkiri ,o· and Ratanakiri are under 
the direct administration of the Kena Mocahhim (Central Committee) of the Khmer Com­
munist Party. Geographically and strategically we can understand why their Kena 
Moaahhim itself governs these areaso. These provinces are all strong military bases 
and abut Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand . 
Each Region is further divided into [decreasing in size] sectors (Damban)e; 
then districts (Srok) ;  then Khum (township or village) and then Phum (hamlet ) .  
Secretaries or chairman of each R�gion have .oheavy influence in their areas. Which 
is to say that they have all political, administrative, economic, military, and 
social responsibility. These "secretaryships" and "chairmanships" are for members 
of the Central Committee who are also members of the Royal Government of National 
Union of Kampuchea. They are intellectuals, "Khmer Rouge core (SnuZ.)  11--long-time 
adherents of the "Khmer communist movement.o" They are "fulfilled candidates" in 
their party. 
In the Southwest Region, important Khmer Rouge dignitaries include Mr. Chou 
Chet, who is the Chairman and the Deputy Minister of Health ; Mr. Phouk Chhay, called 
Nang, who is political commissar for the Southwest Region troops ; Mr. Thuch Rin, 
called Krin (former high school teacher), who is Chairman of the Bureau of Cultural 
Affairs and Information; Ta [Grandfather, an honorific] Mok (revolutionary name), 
who is leader of the Southwest Region troops. The major headquarters is in the 
Amleang Sector. A . printing press there produces the newspaper Revolutionary People 
under the leadership of Mro. Thuch Rin himself. The Southwest Region is the biggest, 
has the greatest troop strength and the most important leadership "cadreo. "  
According to Phouk Chhay 's  report to a meeting at the end of May 1972, the 
monthly expenditures in the Southwest Region reach over two million riels for Khmer 
Rouge military and civilian personnel, who earn 135 riels each per month.o1 
The Special Region is under the leadership of Mr. Sok Thuok, called Von, who 
is the Chairman as well as the Deputy Minister of National Securityo. In addition 
there are Mro. Hang (�evolutionary name) and Comrade Ros Chetthor, called Cheat. 
1 rn mid-1972, 135 riels = US $1o.00 .  
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The important Khmer Rouge dignitaries in the Kena Moaehhim are mostly intellec-
tuals who disappeared from Phnom Penh in 1962 [sia] and 1968 [sia] ,  most importantly: 
Mr. Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense 
in the Royal Government of National Unity [ RGNU] and Commander-in-Chief of 
the "People's Liberation Armed Forces of Kampuchea.e" Mr. Khieu Samphan is 
the third personality in the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 
Mr. Salot Sar (First Personality) is the Secretary-General of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. 
Mr. Ieng Sary is the second personality in the Khmer Communist Party. 
Mr. Son Sen in the fourth personality. 
Mr. Koy Thuon is the Deputy Minister of Finance. 
Mr. Hu Nim 1s  the Minister of Information. 
Mr. Ti v 01 is the Deputy Minister of Information. 
Mr. Hou Yuon is the Minister of Interior Charged with Rural Affairs and 
Cooperatives. 
Mrs. Khieu Ponnary, Deputy Minister of National Education, Culture and Youth.e2 
Mr. Chou Chet, Deputy Minister of Health. 
Mr. Sok Thuok, Deputy Minister of National Security. 
Mr. Pok Doeuskomar, Deputy Foreign Minister. 
Mr. Son Sen and Mr. Pok Doeuskomar really hid quietly in Phnom Penh for the 
folelowing year after the Phnom Penh authorities said they had disappeared. This 1s 
the information which we received from· Khmer Rouge personalities in the bush. 
As for important Khmer Rouge cadre who died in the bush, Mr. Uch Ven (professor) 
died of typhoid and Mr. Chi Kim An (engineer) committed suicide in Phum Srei Andoung. 
The Information and Culture Bureau of the Special Region was at Srei Andoung 
until 7 August 1972, then was dismantled and moved to the east of Phum Srei Russei 
in Dae Srayal Sector. In the beginning of July aircraft heavily bombed Phum Tang 
Khmau and Phum Srei Andoung. 
In the Infonnation Bureau we lived in a circle of comrades who had a socialist 
revolutionary philosophy that was strict and far to the left. Many of these members 
were young people who had been associated with the clandestine Yuv.eK.K. movement 
(Communist Youth of Kampuchea) in Phnom Penh or were members of the Association of 
Khmer Students (AGEK) fattened up by Peking. 
The Special Region's Bureau of Arts was 600 meters southwest of Phum Srei 
Russei. The many youngsters and artistic leaders totaled over 70 people. Most were 
peasants' children; some were children of Khmer Rouge core dignitaries; for exampl e, 
children of Mr. Ieng Sary and Mr. Sieng Po Se. 
2Actually she is Chairman of the Democratic Women's Association and her sister 
Mrs. I eng Thirith held the ministerial post. 
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About three kilometers east of the Information Bureau, or 800 meters west of 
Phum Hong Tnaot, was the large hospital of the Special Region; it was built on the 
banks of a creek at the site of an abandoned village. This hospital could handle 
hundreds of sick and wounded. Drs. Chuon Choeun, Dy Phan, Professor Khhieng Kaon 
and engineer Nguon Eng worked in the hospital, assisted by a few Khmer Rouge doctors 
who had just arrived from Hanoi. 
The Bureau of Economic Affairs was at Phum Tang Khmau on the banks of a stream 
northwest of Wat Tang Khmau. Mr. Sieng Po So had responsibility for Regional eco­
nomic matters, and over the few vehicles used: they included, for example, a 
Landrover and trucks. On the east and south of the Economic Affairs Bureau many 
shelters were built to receive "newly arrived guests" who had j ust run from Phnom 
Penh and whose political trends agreed with those of the Front cadre (Sihanoukism).
The Organization first had to "mature the consciousness" (Satiqarammij,)e3 of these 
"newly arrived guests" here, so they did not have as much freedom to come and go. 
Nor did they have important duties in the Organization aside from digging fields, 
raising crops or a few chickens and ducks to support their own lives. The members 
of the other bureaus called this place the "Front's Phum."  Here we met and talked 
with a Lt. Commander named So Meram and two of his Ensign colleagues on 1 2  November 
1972. 
2. The Organization' s Discipline 
The Organization's discipline was very tough and .strong in nature, which is to 
say it was communist discipleine, as strong as iron. They educated and trained 
(Phsal[lh) (System de dressage) youth and their cadre to become socialists and to be­
come communists by means of a series of increasingly tougher standards. Many docu­
ments were compiled by the Kena Mocchhim to be used as study guides. 
As for the members of the Military Bureau who still l ove King Sihanouk, they 
[the Organization] do not yet dare show their true intentions. They hold only to 
the principle  of struggle in the framework of the Front as the lesson to be taught; 
i. e.,  the principle of national revolution. They lyingly claim, "We are struggling 
to make this revolution in order to liberate the nation from the yoke of American 
imperialism.e" 
Bit by bit they edge into the theory of national democratic revolution and 
stir up class warfare, class rage, and the life and death class struggle in Kampu­
chea. They attack feudalists, reactionaries, and compradore capitalists. They do 
not attack King Sihanouk's name openly nor do they foster and praise it either. 
Some cadre in Khmer Rouge ranks are openly attacking Sihanouk's "feudal traits." 
Those Khmer Rouge cadre who dare to praise King Sihanouk are regarded as people 
opposed to the revolution. They maintain that King Sihanouk is the symbol of feu­
dalism even though �e is living in Peking. 
With the People. The object of the discipline of the Khmer Rouge Angkar which 
is most important is not to disturb the "ways of the people." Each Khmer Rouge must 
absolutely take a modest and simple attitude with the people. They must destroy 
tendencies to seek "authoritarianism" or "officiousness.e" They frequently recall 
the words of Mao Tse-tung that "The people are fish; they are the water [sic]e."  
Revolutionaries (socialist revolution) must become children of the people and must 
become like the people in order to study from the people because "the people are the 
3Toe term also means "mentality" or "spirit" according to context; "conscious­
ness" will appear when Ith Sarin uses the word more formal ly, usually in connection 
with ideology. 
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fount of knowledge which study can never dry up . "  They raise the s logan , "Study from 
the people in order to be l ike the people ,"  but they hold to another principle that 
they "should not let the people lead them by the nose either . "  In their lifestyle :  
s leeping, walking, eating, drinking, dressing, they take care not to be openly dif­
ferent from the people .  Attitudes and words that reach peasants must definitely be 
modest and simple .  This is why the Khmer Rouge require b lack dress with the krama4 
around the necke. Food is neither more plentiful nor of better qual ity than that of 
the people .  They often remind themselves of the poverty of the people who support 
their revoelution. Furthermore, pressure against "seeking good food" has become one 
of their tactics in order to accustom themselves to bear up under a l l  difficulties 
and educate their bodies and their mentalities to become "proletarian (kammajib)e. "  
Therefore, in each bureau they rarely  have the good fortune of having two dishes of 
foode. 
The Khmer Rouge Angka:t> strongly forbids disturbing the produce or goods of the 
people .  Making free with or violating peasants girls is a matter for heavy punish­
mente. According to continuous observateionse, these disciplines are fully  and effec­
tively respected and complied withe. Another effective point in Khmer Rouge "Psycho­
logical Activity" toward peasants is help during troublese. I f  a peasant in a Phum 
is sick, the Khmer Rouge wil l  often go to the house to give an injection or l eave 
medicine even at night or during a storm. In ploughing, transplanting, harvesting, 
or threshing seasons, each bureau must send out its members to hel p .  This being 
"together with the people" in order to "serve the people , "  closely associating with 
the people,  is the implementation of one of the Khmer Rouge theories in educating 
Khmer Rouge cadree. 
These kinds of psychological activities were really successful and deeply 
affected the people more than the instruction in theory dide. The fanning people of 
the base areas who knew nothing of socialist revolution quickly began to love and 
support the Angka:t> because of its sentiments of openness and friendlinesse. 
In the Bureause. In a l l  bureaus the Khmer Rouge l ived col lectively (Samuhabhiib) , 
fol l owing collective discipline (discipline of the Organization) , working according 
to a schedule which the col lective set for each week and month. 
Al l bureau members, whether ordinary members or the chairmen, were required to 
do the same manual activities (Balakamm)e. These manual activities were regarded as 
of the prime necessity in "building (kasan)" yourself to become a proletariat, a 
worker ; if one had the habit of keeping up regular manual activitie s ,  he could endure 
the various hardships which the revolution might meete. Performing manual activity 
renewed the mentality; that is,  changed it into a revolutionary consciousness, a 
proletarian consciousness,  a socialist consciousness .  Khmer Rouge often reminded 
each other that "their revolution sti l l  had a further difficult ,  suffering-laden, 
winding way (La revolution disait Mao tse Toung suit un chemin toujeours tortureux; 
j amais recti l ignee. [The revolution, said Mao Tse-tung, always folelows a tortuous 
path, never proceeds straight ahead . ] ) e. "  Each member must not denigrate the manual 
activities which he makes ; all  of them (except some very important Khmer Rouge digni­
taries) had to grow vegetables , potatoes ,  carry water, chop firewood,  mil l  rice by 
themselves, each taking his turne. Besides matters relating to the l iveleihood of the 
bureau, each member also has an assigned duty such as in the printing plant, etce. 
The organization forbade the use of the words, "A" and "Ming . 115 They took the word 
4An a l l e-purpose red or blue and white-checked cloth that serves men and women 
as protection from the sun or as a covering while bathing; otherwise worn around the 
neck as a scarf. 
5 Impol ite forms of address used to show superior to inferior status or contempte. 
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"Mit" ["friend" or "comrade"] for general use. The words "Bang,"  "Ming , " "Ma , " "Om " ,
"Ta,e" "Yay,e116 are also used but "Mit" is more commone. They often remind each other 
to strengthen "po l itical sentiment'.' more than just "sentiment" by itself.  
The Organization continual ly guides them to try to get rid of "personal traits" 
individual istic aspects which they denounce as "reactionary traits" that in order to 
attain the highest, one must hold firm "an overall  image" of the principle of "col­
lectivity" and concentrate on the greater rather than on personal intereste. If  a 
member easily becomes irritated or is short-tempered� they accuse him of sti l l  having 
"thick individual traits .e" They often connect this element of individualism together 
with "traits of l iberalism . "  All  these traits are regarded as opposed to the revolu­
tion, as traits of the oppressor class ,  traits of the reactionaries. Once in a whi le 
in the l ifestyle meetings, they criticize each other back and forth on this matter 
of "1 iberalism" in "drinking, sleeping, walking, talking" which means that some com- · 
rades eat differently than they are told,  or are sluggardly morning risers or talk 
too much and do not know when to keep quiet, etc. Mutual survei l lance is the duty 
of each member and the judging of the traits l isted above is in the interest of 
educating the members to become "socialists" (Un soaialiste)e. This is a step in 
"taming" a man to become a "machine" (un robot, un automate) contrary to natural 
evolution. 
Aspects of delinquency must be conquered under the Organizationet s guidance;  
for example,  women, liquor, and gamblinge. As for women and gambling, the Khmer Rouge 
Organiezation really seems to have these problems solved along with that of theft. 
Regarding l iquor, there is sti l l  some problem l eft, but the Khmer Rouge Organization 
has eliminated degrading public drunkenness to a great degre e .  
In Khmer Rouge society, they have defi�itely forbidden a man to have two wives. 
Peasants in the Phum, like members in each bureau , also have duties such as 
monitoring each other ' s  activities in their own teams in order to educate each other 
in the way which communists call "construction . "  They have one weekly meeting of a 
team or a group which is called the l ifestyle meeting. During the meeting of the 
team they conduct criticism and self-criticism; that i s ,  they expose deficiencies 
and improper acts, the qualities and the faults of themselves and those of their 
team members. To be able to conduct this criticism and self-criticism requires that 
the Khmer Rouge and villagers check up on one another. Criticism and self-criticism 
are the most important tools of Marxism-Leninism. The principle_s which each member 
must watch for in himself and his comrades are : 
Principle of Manual Activities 
Political Principles 
Principle of Solidarity 
Principle of Consciousness 
-- Principle of Assigni_ng Work 
In the group meeting they examine the principles of the entire group and do 
not speak of the individual. After examining the various· principles of the group, 
they draw up a schedule  for the next week. · 
In this criticism and self-criticism, the Khmer Rouge Organization ' s  guidance 
notes that criticism and self-criticism must not be used as a weapon to get revenge 
or attack each other . They note that criticism and self-criticism are a method of 
6Kinship terms used among intimates or at the market to distinguish age and 
sex. 
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mutual education, a "medicine to counter disease" such as the diseases of "indivi­
dualism-liberalism, officiousness-authoritarianism-bureeaucratism,e" for example. One 
who engages in criticism and self-criticism must have "a cool head always" and not 
be irritable. Performing criticism and self-criticism must always be based ori the 
ways of the Organization and the people. 
Another discipline of the Khmer Rouge (the cadre) is keeping secrets. Members 
of the bureaus must keep confidential their personal information and that of their 
bureau and the Organization. This is why each person must have a new name and must 
hide his former name so that no one else knows it except the higher level. of the 
Organization when it officially needs to seek information of theeindividual. If .e
anyone at all, even in the same rank, or even a peasant wants to know about the 
situation of the bureau or the former name or "class" or birthplace,e.they cannot be 
told. This discipline is reemphasized each week and monitored like various other 
activities as well. 
They have precisely ordained a hierarchy; that is, the lower levels of the 
Organization respect the higher: the Phum Committee follows the orders of the Kh�m 
Committee which in turn takes orders from the District Committee which respects those 
of the Sector, [then the Region] which listens to the Kena Moaahhim (the Central Com­
mittee of the Commllllist Party of Kampuchea). 
Each member must "freely" hand himself over for the Organization "to build." 
One must trust completely in the Angkar because the Organization has as many eyes as 
a "pineapple" and cannot make mistakes. 
This is the dictatorial condition of the party over the individual, an unbounded 
authority of the party over everything. It  is a step directly toward establishing 
the "Dictatorship of the proletariat (Diatatature proletarienne) ." Each member must 
trust the Organization completely; must guard the honor of the Organization; must 
not stab the Organization in the back. If someone tries to perform [a  task] accord­
ing to the Organization's way but instead has a bad result, they do not accuse the 
Organization of having wrongly "pointed the way," but put the blame on the individual 
instead. The individual himself is inept, is deficient. One consequence cannot be 
avoided: that is, it is always shown that the Khmer Rouge cadre has committed a 
violation of discipline or taken authority on himself and taken the name of the 
Organization as a screen [for his deed] .  That which is called the Organization is 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the party's large and small branches which in­
clude committees of the Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region up to the level of the 
Center. 
They forbid to and fro movement between bureaus. Not only that, members who 
do so are "constructively" criticized for the act of "liberalism," for an act con­
trary to the aspect of secrecy. This is why members of bureaus do not have many 
contacts and exchanges of opinion with each other. They have done it this way so as 
to preserve the str�ngth of confidentiality and protect against those who intend to 
betray the Organization. In  daily living in each bureau they often recall the need 
to maintain "the principle of independence and control over things; self reliance;e" 
that is, each bureau must find its own way of making do by itself. The Organization 
only supplies money in the amount of 135 riels per member per month. Each bureau must 
manage to seek food (mostly crabs and snails) and vegetables itself; must "push for 
production" through its own strength; must raise chickens, ducks, pigs in each indi­
vidual bureau [being satisfied] with what possibilities they can manage. 
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3. The Matter ·of Manual Activities 
. The Organization regards performing manual activities as the first duty of 
each member. A communist must definitely forge himself in the work of doing manual 
activities. The performing of manual activities for cadre intellectuals is the same 
sort as that of villagers. 
In the Bureauso. Each member, man or woman, whether intellectual or peasanto' s  
son absolutely must carry water, seek firewood, cook soup, sweep the yard of the 
bureau , dig for crabs in the, fields, water the vegetables , husk paddy, polish rice; 
feed chickens, ducks, and pigs. They divide these tasks by turn and do them on pre­
cise schedules with no thought to bickering or slackingo. Idly looking on, arguing, 
refusing to work is not common. Each person must clearly show patience toward every 
other at the time of fulfilling an activity. A member who is lazy and sluggardly in 
these tasks will be criticized by the other members at the time of the meeting of the 
team or the group . 
The Work of Increasing Production. Each bureau is guided by the higher ievel 
of the Organization to solve its own living problems and not to depend too much on 
the people for nourishment because the people lack much. Each bureau must clear and 
work fields and vegetable gardens by itself. They grow mustard greens , tomatoes, 
mint, trakuan [the water vine aonvoivulus reptans],  gourds and melons , eggplant, 
pepper, potatoes, maize, and beams, for example. Some Khmer Rouge groups everi have 
cattle and water buffalo to work rice fields. In some bureaus, such as the Art 
Office of the Special Region, all the youngsters climb palm trees and collect the 
sap for sugar to use in their own departmento. 
The bureaus also work very hard to develop the raising of ducks,  chickens , and 
pigs. 
Even though the bureaus have chickens , ducks, and pigs, food is  still lacking 
just as much because the Organization induces one to "know how to economize," know 
how to endure and be without hunger to conquer "wants" _and the desire for delicious 
things. Moreover, the region in which we lived was extremely poor in fish and meat ; 
even frogs were hard to find. Two or three eggs were boiled with mustard greens for 
12  peopleo. Sometimes they boiled only mustard greens with no fish or meat. Some 
Khmer Rouge ate fresh fish only three or four times a year and not enough of it even 
them. 
Serving the People. Each Khmer Rouge had to be absorbed in the "philosophy of.o
the people"; had to j oin with the peopleo. Helping out in the problems of the people , 
especially the people of the base areas, is  the primary matter the higher levels of 
the Organization paid attention to. When the people raised a darn or dug a pond or a 
dike or built a house, the Khmer Rouge teams nearest the Phum took turns together to 
go help and paid attention to what they were doing, tooo. At the time of transplant­
ing , harvesting , threshing, they also took turns to give ptmctual assistance . The 
Organization helped with the affairs of the poorest farmers most ofo·oall. 
This is one aspect which interested us. 
The Khmer Rouge Organization regarded manual activities as the chief principle 
with the aim that: 
1 )  Their cadre and members at every level ready themselves for various future 
difficulties; to develop the habit of  enjoying this manual work which 1s 
an important aim in order to. progress in building a socialist nation : 
so 
2) So that their members and cadres draw closer to the people ,  understand the 
people ' s  desires and their sufferings , and profit by the opportunity to learn 
from the peopl e .  In the practical performance of a task the people are the 
source of knowledge that can never dry upe. 
3) Reinforce habits of respect of the Organization ' s  team and group discipline 
fol lowing a type of materialist discipl ine (Discipline materialiste) of factory 
workerse. 
[4) ] So that each member of  cadre tries to forge himsel f  in order to s l ip away 
from "traits" that are not revolutionary, not proletarian such as the "traits" 
of most intel lectuals ,  for example . I f  one does not apply himsel f  to manual 
activities , he cannot love the people and will  maintain a mentality that deni­
grates the manual activities of others which is the mentality of a reactionary, 
a feudalist, a capitaliste. 
According to materialist theory, only the worker-proletariat builds the world, 
builds each [separate] socialist [system]e. In every so�iety, this worker and 
proletarian class is more numerous than all  otherse. There.fore , according to 
the character of democracy , should not state power fal l into the hands of this 
class? This is the philosophy of the Marxists-Leninistse. 
5 )  Increase the spirit of materialism-realism-scientism which, according to 
Marxist-Leninists, will  conquer the philosophy of id.ealism (Idealisme) which 
serves the reactionary clas s ,  the oppressor class  (this is the philosophy of 
the Khmer Rouge)e. Moreover ,  this work of manual activities i s  also a medicine 
to help conquer a narrow, sluggardly mentality or philosophy (Etroitesse de 
Vue)  . 
[ 4 . ]  Political Education 
The Khmer Rouge are very interested in political education. Political strength 
is their first strength; mileitary strength is only an instrument of political strengthe. 
Khmer Rouge members in a l l  frameworks must receive political educateion without fai l .  
They study in political school s ,  at the office, during meetings, at conferences , dur­
ing the l iving group gatheringse. 
Education at Pol itical Study School s .  The Khmer Rouge Organization now greatly  
lacks administrators (cadre) endowed with high quality and political culture. Mr. 
Hou Yuon himsel f  admietted this problem at the Inte l lectualse' Conference at the end 
of May 1972 .  Each administrator before assuming a responsibility must receive a long 
education and training over a period of one to three years, at leaste, and must have 
served their movement for a long time in the Yuv . K . K .  (Communist Youth of Kampuchea) 
or 1n the S . N . K . P .  (Association of Democratic Women of  Kampuchea)e. 
Each administrator must have righteous precepts for living and righteous, clean 
politics ; that i s :  
1 )  Love , respect and serve the people-workers-peasants with the whole heart and 
soul ; not be dictatorial toward the people ,  not intimidate the peop l e .  Must 
always be modest and simple  toward the people .  
2 )  Along with always protecting the interests of  the people ,  do nothing to 
disturb the goods of the people ,  even a single pepper or a can of ric e .  May 
not extort goods of the people  either by "hot" or "cold" mean s .  May not take 
bribes from the people .  
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·, 
3) If  one wrongs the people, he must beg their pardon. 
4 )  Speak, sleep, walk, stand; sit, eat, smoke , play, laugh in a refined unob­
trusive manner following the traditions of the peopleo. 
5 )  Do not go beyond the bounds of propriety toward womeno. 
6) Do not drink or eat anything of a bad nature that is non-revolutionary. 
7) Do not gamble. 
8) Do not touch money or pro·perty of the people or of the Organization. 
9) Must have burning rage toward the enemy. 
10) .oMust do manual activities like the peopleo. 
11)  Must always respect other comrades in the collective and in the Organiza­
tion. Must not work in a dictatorial, individual manner. 
12) Must constructively conduct criticism· and self-criticism; in the Front 
organization [work] honestly seeking to build strong internal solidarity and 
unityo. Do not fight together outside the Organiza�ion nor use slander in 
order to struggle for influence. 
13) Must awaken in order to make. the revolution by oneself; do not depend on 
others or foreigners or let anyone replace one. Must clearly understand that 
this revolution is the revolution of the people of Kampuchea and the people 
must make it themselves and seize the destiny of the nation themselves ; do not 
·sleep waiting for foreigners to do it. 
14) Must maintain the image of the mastery of the task at hand;  know how to 
solve all problems that relate to living whether in the realm of thought or on 
the material side of the peopleo. 
15) Must strongly believe that our struggle has real difficulties but will 
certainly be victorious. 
* * * 
In the political education schools the Khmer Rouge Organization uses clever 
tricks, uses various documents to educate according to the lines of each member (they 
usually say political awareness ) ,  which is to say that , for a member who still holds 
Sihanouk in affection (Cadre of the Front) and fears a socialist regime, they usually 
use only documents which square with the ideas of the Front for education or they let 
this category of member simply receive training at his bureauo. Sometimes they show 
the road to red theory by means of various documents ;  there are seminal documents 
dealing with: 
The Division of Khmer Society into Classes 
Class Struggle 
Mass View (dassan mahajan) 
Building Proletarian Principles 
Criticism and Self-criticism (critiqu� et auto-critique) 
Proper and Improper Pride 
Quality of Administrators 
etco. 
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Regarding full cadre (krapkha'tJ-4 ben Zakkh�: )  core administrators who are "can­
didates [sic ] "  of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (Membre du Parti Commueniste Khmer)e, 
their educational limits seek to instill continually deeper socialist habits (PZi 
socialist) aiming for a communist regime. And the education of this category ofe. 
[members] is secret, not revealed to the category of members of the Front or to the 
category of ordinary [members ] .  That is, [it is restricted to] those cadre who are 
candidates and whom the Khmer Rouge Organization intends to be their core in each 
region, to be bureau chairman or political commissars for their troops. 
In the Khmer Rouge Organ,:ization's Special Region, the people who have the duty 
to teach and educate the potential cadre include Mr. Sieng Po Se, Mr. Ros Chetthor, 
Mr. Sok Thuok, Mr. Chi Kim An (died at the beginning of April 1972), and Comrade Hang 
(revolutionary name). 
In the Southwest Region, Mr. Chou Chet, Mr. Phouk Chhay, and Mr. Thuch Rin are 
the instructors. 
Education and Study in the Bureaus. In each office, the Chairman and deputy 
chairman are the study leaders who discuss various goals which are set forth in the 
documents. All documents used for study emanate from the Central Committee (Kena 
Mocchhim) of the Communist Party. Study in the bureaus cannot be done regularly. 
Sometimes they do it once a month, sometimes once every two months, depending on 
available free time. 
Besides the study from documents, they regard the living group meetings (meet­
ings for criticism and self-criticism) which are held every Sunday as especially 
appropriate for political education and monitoring the implementation of political 
theory and approach. In  the criticism and self-criticism meetings they often criti­
cize each other the most for traits of "individualism" and "liberalism.e" They try 
to conquer these "traits" with the aim of "taming" men to become instruments to re­
spect and apply the discipline of the Organization without complaining, like a machine 
on behalf of this socialist regime. They make and strengthen into a habit the idea 
of respecting the rhythm of discipline, the tempo of work, the rhythm of life accord­
ing to the worker discipline which they hold up as the model. That is, they implement 
the theory of proletarianization by taking the weight of the party's authority and 
applying its full pressure bit by bit. This is the preliminary beginning of the 
"Dictatorial authority of the proletariat" (phase primaire de la dictature proZeta­
rienne).  
Political Education at Meetings. We already know that meetings are an impor­
tant school of political education for peoples of socialist countries. Khmer Rouge 
leaders have paid very close attention to the matter of meetings. 
In all places, even small Phum, Khmer Rouge leaders always seize on everyday 
ceremonies and transform them into large or small meetings. At the end of the har­
vest season they induce the villagers to hold a meeting to profit by politically 
educating and by encouraging the villagers to try to "push themselves,e" increasing 
production, too. At the meetings there are always artistic performances as a means 
of propagandizing-educating-fomenting "revolutionary violence" so they are enraged 
against the "enemy" (that is, we Khmer ourselves ! ). Besides speeches from the core 
[cadre ] ,  they arrange for men and women representatives of the villagers to rise and 
give their opinions, which statements they call "raising interest" to support their 
revolution and struggle. Let me note that in each Phum, they have arranged for one 
of their core to conduct political education once or twice every year. Funerals of 
Khmer Rouge troops are also diverted into meetings. 
On 30 September 1972 they conducted a major meeting at all the Regions to com­
memorate the founding anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea which they 
claimed was formed in 1951. They printed the history of their 21-year struggle. 
Before 30 September 1972 the Khmer Rouge Organization concealed and did not let out 
the name of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The year 1972 was the first year in 
which the Khmer Rouge showed their face publicly as a "name brand.e" 
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On many prominent. red banners they inscribed various slogans concerning· the 
task of leadership of the "party.., ; as prime examplese: 
"Only the Communis·t Party of Kampuchea can lead the revolution to defini­
tive victory.e" 
"The Communist Party of Kampuchea holds the task of leading the revolution 
of Kampuchea.e" 
On 30 September 1972 at seven p. m., north of Phum Tang Khmau, under the falling
drops of a light rain, a microphone loudly ordered all comrades .eto roll down their 
shirtsleeves, button their collars, take off their caps and be ready to salute the 
"party flag.e" The onlookers saluted silently . . . e. As the anthem "Salute the party 
flag" [was playing]e, the lights came up and, ripping out of its blue sheath, emerged 
a red sheet of cloth, four square meters in size with the emblem of a hammer and 
sickle touching in the center of the red sheet.e. I looked left and right and saw the 
comrades nearby clenching their fists, silently saluting the flag. I also saluted 
with clenched fist like them and turned slightly to whisper in French to a friend 
who had the same political philosophy, "It is like they stabbed me right in the 
heart with a knife . . . .  I have the impression of living in the U.S. S.R." My friend 
made a sign for me to speak softly so nobody would hear. A little later, taking 
advantage of a time when other people were paying attention to the speech of the 
Deputy Chairman of the Special Region, both of us secretly motioned and slowly edged 
out of there, giddy with a feeling of hopelessness piled on. There was never a time 
when I despaired of the nation as I did then . . e. .  
Political Education during Conferences. During conferences such as the Con­
ference of Intellectuals, for example, Khmer Rouge dignitaries or their administra­
tors gathered to discuss difficult problems and various deficiencies with which they
had met in implementing the way of the party. These conferences were of a sometimes 
public, sometimes secret character. In open conferences they would raise problems 
in the framework of the Front to be discussed. They concealed and did not speak of 
the "Communist party" or about the political program of the party. In the circle of 
communist "candidates" the various discussions in the conferences were closed because 
they discussed the real political program of the party, about the party's tactics 
and strategy. Aside from candidates or important core [cadre]e, no members had the 
right to attend thes� major conferences. 
5 .  The Manner of Implementing Phum, Khum, District, 
Sector, and Regional Government 
At this time the Khmer Rouge had divided the Phum-Khum-District-Province-Region 
system into one of Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region. Forming of Sectors and 
Regions out of our Provinces and Regions. was still not clearly done. In reality each 
Khmer Rouge Sector had a size equal to one of our Provinces and the Regions were 
equal to one of our Administrative Regions (Pegions administy,atives)° .  
Each Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region was led by a Phum, Khum, District, 
Sector, Region Committee. They often abbreviated it as the Kena-Phum, ·Khum, Sector. 
Each committee has the following composition: 
Chairman 
Deputy Chairman 
-- Members (few or many) charged with economics, social affairs, culture, 
military, etc. 
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As for the Khum, District, and Sector, they had a political commissar of the 
party assigned called the "party-sec" (Secretary of the party) . The "party-sec" had 
the greatest authority because he was the representative of the party assigned to 
monitor the activities of the entire committee . In the Khum where the chairman did 
not understand about the revolution, they designated a party pol itical commissar to 
assist the committee . The political commissar or the "party-sec" were a l l  candidates 
or ful l  members in the party. As for the other members of the committee (except for 
Sector and Region Committees) some had not yet become party members , that is,  were 
just sympathizers or were people who had supported their revolution for a long time 
and had received in-depth political education from them.  There were sti l l  chairmen 
or committee members of the Front at some Phum and Khum who remained in the framework 
of the Front ; that is ,  they sti l l  bel ieved that [they] were making the revolution 
simply to hand authority back to Sihanouk . As for the members of this sort of com­
mittee, the Khmer Rouge Organization always monitored them and often gradually  gave 
political education to attract them into skipping toward the socialist revolution in 
stage s .  
From the end of 1970 unti l  mid-1971, the composition of the Front committees 
at the Phum, Khum and District was still  highly confused.  Sihanoukists had most of 
the important jobs in the lower organization in sgme Phum, Khum, District, and Sector 
committees .  All  these members were picked and forced [to serve] by the Viet Cong­
North Vietnamese ; therefore , they l acked deep political education general ly.  As for 
the higher organization, some Khmer Rouge Sector committees and Region committees 
held exclusive domain; that is,  the members of  a l l  the leadership committees were 
entirely ful 1 members of the party. In order to become a ful 1 member ·of the party, 
a person had to join the serve their movement at least for two or three years and 
fulfil l  al l their conditions . 
The Khmer Rouge used pol itical tactics in swa l lowing up the strength of the 
Sihanouk Front . At first , in 1970 and 1971, when Viet Cong and North Vietnamese com­
munist forces were invading and expanding [into Cambodia], these forei gn communist 
troops used King Sihanouk ' s  stock of popularity as a screen in order to gather 
strength and support in the strata of the people whom they controlled . At that time, 
Khmer Rouge strength, military and political, was very weak . Both Viet Cong-North 
Vietnamese and Khmer communists met to change political tactics so as to gather in 
the Sihanoukist strength because in most of the rural areas Sihanouk ' s  popularity 
was still strong . A large number of peasants and merchants sti l l  supported King 
Sihanouk which led the Khmer Rouge leaders to hide themselves behind the screen of 
the "National United Front of Kampuchea . "  The Central Committee of the Khmer Commu­
nist Party pulled Sihanouk into their trap by means of Peking . Having gotten him in 
hand, the Khmer Rouge got ready to squeeze him dry . 
Now the strength of the Sihanouk Front has changed into political strength of 
the Khmer Communist Party. Khmer Rouge cadre, whether political or military, have 
entered and taken over all  organizatioRs of the Front, l arge or sma l l ,  and have re -. 
pl aced all  the Sihanoukist s .  All the Sihanoukists have been changed into Khmer 
Rouge . Today , since the Khmer Rouge started to show themselves to the people,  Khmer 
Rouge cadre actively began to teach socialist theory . 
* * * 
Henceforth in Khmer problems, both the remains of the monarchy and of Sihanouk­
ism wil l  no longer have the power to continue haunting us . The wheel  of history 
spins forward, never retreating . Only two political forces confront each other: the 
free Khmer Republican regime and the force of the communists . 
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In the ongoing war to stop the Indochinese Communists, the Khmer nation defi­
nitely needs a revised, new national principle which will be the second phase of the 
revolution of March 18 in order that we have our own possibility to check the engulf­
ing force of the communist revolution in Indochina. So that we avoid a transforma­
tion of Khmer destiny into that of Poland, Khmer leftists must rid themselves of 
risky and nonsensical political notions and come to help organize the national soci­
ety to seek progress and well-being in a Khmer style in the circle of the Khmer 
family because only a Khmer regime represents the real will of the Khmer nation and 




A SHORT GUIDE FOR APPLICATION OF PARTY STATUTES 
(Translated captured 
document, Phnom 
Penh, 1975 . )  
I.  Party Name 
Our party is called "The CoJlllilunist Party of Kampuchea" i n  accordance with the 
recoJlllilendations passed by the Central Committee in September 1966. 
I I. Goal of the Party 
1. The immediate goal of the party is to lead the people to succeed in the 
national democratic revolution, to exterminate the imperialists, feudalists, and 
capitalists, and to form a national revolutionary state in Cambodia. 
2. The long range goal of the party is to lead the people in creating a 
socialist revolution and a Communist Society in Cambodia. 
I II. Party Membership 
Requirements for party membership are as follows: 
a. Candidates who desire to join the party must be members of the Young Men's 
Communist League, the Farmers' Association and the Young Women's Democratic Associa­
tion. These requirements apply to any location where such organizations have been 
established; they do not apply to a location where such organizations have not yet
been formed. 
b. Candiedates who desire to join the party must have a good revolutionary 
attitude and must have performed revolutieonary activities which have been acknowl­
edged and satisfied by the masses. These activities can take many forms, such as in 
the political, economic, liaison or military fields. 
c. Candidates who desire to j oin the party must have a good and clean personal 
history and must be from the lower class, such as poor farmer of middle farmer espe­
cially of the lower stratum. We must pay special attention to these important points 
and ensure that those who do not have a good clean personal history, such as former 
soldiers, agents, subdistrict chiefs, militia members or those who were in contact 
with the enemy, do not join the party. 
d .  Candidates must not have bad morals, must not drink excessively, chase 
women, fight, rob or have earned their wealth illegally. 
Candidates who desire to j oin the party must be at least 18 years of age. 
f. Candidates who meet the above requirements, must be selected, taught, and 
tested for a period of three months to develop knowledge about the way, spirit, poli­





g. When requirements for party membership are finally met, candidates. will be 
allowed to become a member of the party with the unanimous agreement of the full 
branch committee and the approval of the full district committee. Candidates will 
not be admitted by the decision of an individual branch member or cadre as it some­
times occurred in the past. 
sponsors 
Candidates who apply for party membership must have two party members as 
who in turn can guarantee their backgrounds and various requirements for 
joining the party. 
The admission of new party members must be performed as follows: 
a. The ceremony will include the secretary or deputy secretary of the branch 
committee, representing the party, who will serve as the chairman of the meeting, 
the two sponsors of the candidate, and the candidate himself, a total of four persons. 
b. The chairman announces the subject and program of the meeting. 
c. The chairman leads in the salute to the party flag and pays respects to 
the fallen party members. 
d. The chairman introduces the biography of the candidate and announced the 
decision of the branch committee and the approval of the district committee to admit 
the applicant into the party. The chairman will question the applicant to make sure 
that he is willing to join the party. 
e. The applicant reaffirms his intention and reasons for joining the party. 
f. The applicant takes an oath in front of the party flag by raising his fist 
in front of the party flag and reads the following oath: " I ,  ...... , swear in front 
of the party flag that I will be loyal and unconditionally serve the national revolu­
tionary party and class workers for my whole life." 
g. The chairman recognizes the new member _eand assigns him activities to per­
form in a branch organization and sets up a probationary period for the new party 
member based on his class. The probation period is three months for a poor class 
farmer and six months for a middle class farmer. 
h. The chairman and participants at the meeting will congratulate the new 
party member and encourage him to work hard and learn in order to become a good party 
member. 
i. The new party member agrees to adhere to the life style of a new Communist 
party member. 
j. The chairman leads the participants in the salute to the flag before clos­
ing the meeting. On the occasion of the admission of the new party member, a drink 
may be arranged during the meeting, however, the meeting will not be longer than one 
and one-half hours. 
3. Duties of party members. 
a. I nternal duties. Hold criticism and self-criticism sessions once every 
two weeks or once each month to review work performances, to study past experiences, 
to seek out good qualities and failures and to plan work for the future. 
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Hold individual and group sessions to study Marxiesm-Leninism, the political 
teachings and aims of the party, discuss ways to participate in the revolutionary 
activities of the people and revolutionary capabilities, and study means to strengthen 
the way, spirit, and politics of the revolution. Pay a contribution of one riel each 
month. Hold criticism and self-criticism meetings to instill correctness among indi­
viduals and comrades. Absolutely protect the secrets of the party, absolutely pre­
serve the strength of the party, absolutely respect the discipline and organization 
of the party, and absolutely preserve the union and internal unity according to the 
codes of the party. Display examples of the work and activities of the revolution 
1n accordance with the way, spirit, and politics of the party. 
b. Duties among the masses. Propagandize and teach the people about the vari­
ous subjects which serve the civil war in order that the people will increase produc­
tion according to the decisions and the directives of the party. In this matter we 
have to serve the people faithfully an-d learn forom them. Org�iez� the people accord­
ing to different groups in order that their strengths may be concentrated into guer­
rilla units, militia units, the tmited fighting women's associations, and production 
associations. Make circulars and finallif select good people for admittance into the 
party. 
4. Rights of party members. Party members of all classes have the same rights 
as follows: 
a. All new members may be considered as candidates for party positions and be 
selected and nominated for leading activities of the party. 
b. Party members may discuss and offer opinions of dacisiQns concerning the 
work of the party in accordance with democratic centralism, reg�rdless of whether it 
1s a small or big problem at any level. 
c. A party member has the right to criticize political matters or plans of the 
organization at any level in acc.ordance with democratic centralism. However, observe 
that these rights belong to full party members. For provisional members, they have 
the right to discuss problems with full party members but are not entitled to make 
decisions. This means they do not have the right to offer opinions or decisions con­
cerning the selection and nomination of new members, nor can t,hey select and nominate 
themselves to party positions. 
5. Party Organizations 
b. Branches and Cells 
A branch committee is a party organization which is organized at the subdis­
trict level. A cell is subordinate to a branch and is established at the village 
level. 
Any subdistrict which has three or more party members may organize a branch 
committee. A subdistrict which has from six to eight party members must nominate a 
secretary and a deputy secretary for leading the branch co11IDittee. Any subdistrict 
which has ten or more party members must have a committee of from three to five mem­
bers to lead the branch. One committee member is the secretary, another is the 
deputy secretary, and the remainder will hold other positions in the committee. 
A village which has two or more party members may form a cell with a chairman 
to lead it. (Note. A branch committee is a formation of cells. This is because 
the branch is the party's organization in the subdistrict cmd cells are the partye' s  
organization in the village. Usually, a good cell chairman in a village can be 
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nominated as a member of the branch committee in the subdistrict 1n accordance with 
the rule of three to five members to a branch committee.o) 
b. Duties of Branch Committee and Cell Members 
The duties of branch committee and cell members are the same. 
Internal duties. Hold criticism and self-criticism sessions once every two 
weeks or once a month to review work performances, to draw on past experiences, to 
seek out qualities and failures, and to plan new work to be performed in the future. 
Organize study groups in order to strengthen our spirits and to increase our capa­
bilities ; lead the people politically by holding branch meetings once every three 
months to examine the previous work and plan new activities. Select and nominate 
new organization leaders, such as a secretary, deputy secretary, and committee mem­
bers. Examine our financial accounts and assets, protect the secrets of the party, 
preserve the revolutionary strength, respect the discipline and organization of the 
party, and maintain our union and internal unity according to the plans of the party. 
Duties among the masses. Propagandize and teach the people about the variouos 
subjects which serve the civil war, such as military teachings and agricultural pro­
duction , in accordance with the decisions and directives of the party. Organize the 
people according to classes in order to utilize their strength in guerrilla units, 
militia units, women ' s  associations, production units, the Young Men 's  Communist 
League, and the Farmer' s  Association. Also select and nominate good people for the 
party. 
c. District Committee 
The district committee is an organization of the party at the district level. 
Its duties are to lead and undertake the work of the party in the district. The 
district committee clearly leads the branches in all subdistricts of the district. 
In each district, a district committee will be established when there are three 
or more branches. The district committee is to be formed at a meeting attended by 
the representatives of all branches in the districto. The district committee has 
three to five committee members depending on the number of branches in the district .  
The district committee must have one secretary and one deputy secretary. 
Internal duties. The district committee holds a meeting once each month. 
However, a special meeting may be held if there is an immediate need to examine old 
work, correct qualities and failures and plan new work for the district committee. 
Organize duties to increase political capabilities and organize good leadership in 
the district. Study sessions must be kept short so that they will not interfere 
with the basic work among the people .  Properly lead the branches of the entire dis­
trict to carry out the decisions and directives of the higher organization on time. 
Increase the formation of branches and cells in the subdistricts and villages 
of the entire districto. Organize a district meeting once every six months to be 
attended by representatives of all branches in the district. Hold criticism and 
self-criticism sessions to seek out qualities and failures, prepare new plans for 
the next six-month period, select new district committee members, and examine the 
financial accounts and assets of the district. 
Duties among the masses. Let the branche's and cells propagandize and teach 
the people on military, economic and various other subjects in accordance with the 
decisions and directives of the party. Let the branches and cells organize the 
people according to classes in order to  attain better quality and more numerous 
people for the popular revolution. Make the district better and better. 
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f .  
IV.  Organizational Statutes of the Party 
and 
The organizational 
are as folelowse: 
statutes of the party are based on democratic centralism 
a .  Party l eadership at the top echelon o f  the organization is establieshed by 
a vote. However, in places where conditions are not suitable ,  the party will make 
the decisions and appointmentse. 
b .  Every decision of the party is initially decided by the majority before 
party members are given an opportunity to express their opinionse. 
c .  It is the duty of a member to respect the majority (the l ower echelon must 
respect the higher echelon)e. A party member must respect the committees and organi­
zations, and these organizations at all  levels of the party must respect the central 
leadershipe. 
d .  Party members and committees at al l levels must respect and carry out all  
decisions and directives of  the party.  If they disagree with a decision to a direc­
tive of the party, members have the right to request a meeting with a higher echelon 
through the chain of command . While waiting for a new decision they,e.ehowev�r, must 
respect and execute the old decisione. 
e .  Leadership and working procedures must respect and follow the directions 
of the collective leadership and each person wil l  carry out his own responsibility. 
Party organizations at all levels have the right to solve and manage their 
work according to the framework based on the political way and decisions of the 
party. However, when they encounter important problems or problems which are beyond 
their capabilities , they must report and ask for a decision from a higher party levele. 
Folelowing each decision, the lower level organ must report to the higher level party 
echelon the various situations at their respective levels .  The leadership organiza­
tions must create various guides for lower level organizations based on fixed time 
periods , existing situations , and work experiencee. 
V .  Party Discipline 
1 .  In order to maintain good union and unity in the party, our party has the 
goal of respecting the discipline of the party organization. The discipline of the 
party is strict and perfect , and it follows the enlightened way of each member. Each 
party member must respect and act according to the discipline of  the party. To re­
spect the discipline and organization of the party means to respect the spiritual 
way of the party, the political way and purpose of the party, the various decisions 
of the party , and the various regulations of the party. 
2 .  Any organization or party member who opposes the spiritual way of the 
party, the political way and purpose of the party, the various decisions of the 
party; who causes a break of union or unity in the party; who does not perform his 
duty; who reveal s  party secrets causing damage to the party; who embezzles party 
funds and property; or who creates other serious and minor violations , will  be dis­
ciplined as followse: 
a .  For the committees--criticize and warn offenders only within the party .  
Change some personnel on committees or change the whole committee and form a new onee. 
b .  For personnel- -criticize and warn members only within the party. Change a 
member ' s  job, demote him to a lower position, suspend him for a given period, or ex­
pel him from the party.  
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c .  To discipline any committee which has committed an error, proposals for 
such discipline must be initiated by the next higher ievel committee and approved by 
a higher level organization before the action is carried outo. 
d. In order to criticize and warn a branch committee which is in e·rror, the 
district committee has the right to execute the disciplineo. However, to carry out 
major disciplinary measures, such as a changeover of the branch committee, the dis­
trict committee must have the prior approval of the province committee. · 
e. For members who have erred and must be punished by criticism or warning, 
the committee has the right to execute the discipline. For personnel who have erred 
and who must have his j ob changed, be demoted, or expelled from the party, the com­
mittee must have the prior approval of a higher level echelon before discipline can 
be executedo. For the expulsion of a member from the party, which is the harshest 
discipline, the committee which proposes this discipline and the higher echelon 
which approves the discipline, must consider the benefit and loss to the party before 
making the decisiono. At the same time, consequences resulting from the expulsion of 
the member from the party must be consideredo· so that the decision will not cause any 
harm to the party. 
V I .  Party Finances and Assets 
1. Finance and assets of the party come from the monthly contributions and 
the various assistance provided by party members , people of various revolutionary 
associations,  and from trading and production activities of the party. 
2 .  The monthly contribution of party members is fixed at one riel per month. 
3 .  The request for various assistance from the people must be approved by the 
regional organization. 
...
4 .  To keep and control the money and assets of the party, there must be an 
accurate system of accounting for incomes and expenditures which will be examined 
collectively. The expenditure and use of money and assets of the party wil l  be de­
cided col lectively. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 
by 
Timothy Michael Carney 
SALOT SAR 
Secretary-General, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
Salot Sar was born 19 May 1928 in Kompoi;ig Thom. He studied at the College 
Technique in Phnom Penh earning a Brevet d'Enseignement Industriel. His specialty 
was carpentry. He left .Phnom Penh for Paris in AugUot 1949 to  study radio electronics 
at the Ecole Francaise de Radio-electricite. He failed his examinations at three 
sessions and returned to Phnom Penh in January 1953. 
Salot Sar joined the Pracheachon Gro'Llp after his return and became active in 
leftist journalist circles. In 1963 Sihanouk included him among 34 leftists, right­
ists and other subversives invited to form a government. Salot Sar and others evi­
dently believed the public identification foreshadowed repression and left for the 
maquis at the same time as did Ieng Sary and Son Sen. In 1971 he reappeared as one 
of the signers of a National United Front of Kampuchea intellectuijls' appeal. In 
March 1972 he was designated one of the three vice-chairmen of the High Command of 
the Cambodian People'es National Liberation Armed Forces. Salot Sar had responsi­
bility for the Military Directorate. China Pictorial photographs show him among the 
greeters during Sihanouk's 1973 trip to Cambodia. 
Salot Sar' s wife, Khieu Ponnary, is Chairman of the Association of Democratic 
Women of Kampuchea. Ieng Sary's wife is her sister. 
Salot Sar's brother, Salot Chhay, ran the Khmer Republic's official daily 
newspaper. 
IENG SARY 
Deputy Prime Minister charged with Foreign Affairs 
Actually born in 1930 in Vinh Binh province, South Vietnam, Ieng Sary claimed 
to have been born in Prey Veng, Cambodia on 1 January 1930. He probably did so in 
order to take advantage of scholarships for those born in Cambodia proper. He 
studied at Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh, earning a Baccalaureat, Premier Partie and 
left Phnom Penh in October 1950 for commercial studies in  Paris. He changed to the 
Institut d'eEtudes politiques in 1953. 
An active and travelled leftist, Ieng Sary became president of the Union of 
Khmer Students for 1955-56. He returned to Cambodia in 1957 and taught at Lycee 
Sisowath then Lycee Kampubot. In 1963 he disappeared into the bush after one of 
Sihanouk's confrontations with the left. 
Ieng Sary reemerged in Peking in August 1971 as Special Envoy from the Interior 
Part of the National United Front and Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) of 
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Kampuchea. He returned to Cambodia in late 1973 to become Special Advisor to the 
Office of the RGNU Deputy Prime Minister (Khieu Samphan) and in August 1975 assumed 
his present title which the April 1976 People's Representative Assembly reaffirmed. 
He also holds a leading role in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea. 
Ieng Sary's wife, Khieu Thirith had also joined in leftist student activities 
in France. She holds a French degree in English literature. An RGNU official she 
continues in the government of Democratic Kampuchea as Minister of Social Action. 
She also represents Phnom Penh factory workers in the People's Representative Assem­
bly. Her sister married Saloth Sar. 
SON SEN 
Deputy Prime Minister charged with National Defense 
An ethnic Khmer, Son Sen was born 12 June 1930 in Tra Vinh province of South 
Vietnam. He left Phnom Penh for France in September 1950 after studies at the Ecole 
Normale de Phnom Penh, a pedagogical school. H� studied teaching in France until he 
lost his scholarship for having been a sponsor of the August 1955 Khmer student 
political meeting in Paris. He returned to Cambodia in May 1956 to teach at Phnom 
Penh's Lycee Sisowath. 
Son Sen joined the Sangkum Reastr Niyum in 1958 and became director of cur­
riculume.at the National Pedagogical Institute. He temporarily lost his job in mid-
1962 when accused with other teachers of attempting to discredit the monarchy and 
Sangkum in contacts with students. Then, in February 1963 he was accused of insti­
gating student disturbances in Siem Reap after which he figured on Sihanouk's list 
of 34 leftists invited to form a government. He ran to the bush in 1963 at the same 
time as Salot Sar and Ieng Sary. 
A March 1972 decree establishing the High Command of the Cambodian Peoplese' 
Liberation Armed Forces named him as Chief of the General Staff. He received his 
present title in August 1975. He serves in the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. 
Mrse. Son Sen, Yun Yat, also formerly taught at Lycee Sisowath. She is  a native 
of Siem Reap and studied at the College des Jeunes Filles in Phnom Penh. She joined 
her husband in the maquis apparently in 1965. Yun Yat figures in the April 1976 
government of Democratic Kampuchea as Minister of Culture and Education and repre­
sents Phnom Penh factory workers in the People's Representative Assembly. 
KHIEU SAMPHAN 
Chairman of the State Presidium 
Son of a minor civil servant, Khieu Samphan was born 27 July 1931 in Svay 
Rieng. He attended Lycee in Cambodia. In 1954 he arrived in France to study law 
and economics; he received a Doctoratees Sciences Economiques from the University of 
Paris in 1959. In  1956 he served as Secretary-General of the Khmer student union. 
Khieu Samphan returned to Cambodia in 1959 and opened the biweekly French news­
paper, L'Observateur, which mixed praise of Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union with 
articles on Khmer customs, lifestyle, and the economy. The Ministry of Security 
interrogated Khieu Samphan in early 1960, questioning him on his anti-monarchy and 
pro-communist attitudes. The Minister of Security apparently masterminded a success-
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ful attack which saw Khieu Samphan set upon, stripped naked, and photographed in. 
broad daylight on a Phnom Penh street in August 1960. 
By 1962, however, he had joined Sihanouk's Sangkum Reastr Niyum and success� 
fully ran for Parliament, a feat he duplicated in 1966. He served as Secretary of 
State for Commerce from October 1962 to July 1963. The tenor of Sihanouk's invective 
against Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon in the wake of the March-April 1967 Samlaut upris­
ing caused them to run for the bush. 
After Sihanouk's deposition Khieu Samphan publicly reappeared as Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defense of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampu­
chea, then Commander in Chief of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed 
Forces as wel l. The April 1976 Cambodian Peoples' Representative Assembly elected 
him to his present position. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. 
Khieu Samphan remained a bachelor during the Sihanouk era. 
HU NIM 
Minister of Information 
Born 25 July 1932 in the district of Prey Chhor, Kompong Cham province, Hu Nim 
was educated in Cambodia and France where he earned a Licence in Law during studies 
from 1955 to 1957. He eventually  received a Doctorate in Public Law from Phnom Penh 
University in 1965. He also holds a diploma in Economic and Customs law. Hu Nim 
worked as a customs and treasury official. 
On 30 December 1957 he joined the Sangkum Reastr Niyum and won a seat in the 
National Assembly elections in 1958 and again in 1962 and 1966. He represented a 
district in Kompong Cham province. Hu Nim participated in a number of Sihanouk-era 
governments first as Undersecretary of State at the Prime Ministry from April to July 
1958, then undersecretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior for Parliamentary 
Relations from July 1958 to February 1959. From February to June 1959 he served as 
Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Justice charged with "Assainissement 
General," an anti-corruption post. He rejoined the government from August to October 
1962 as Secretary of State for Commerce. While a deputy he wrote for and worked at 
a number of government and private publications including Realities and Neak Cheat 
Niywn. 
Hu Nim became an officer of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association at its 
1964 founding, then replaced its President in 1967 at a time when Sihanouk was moving 
against the left in the wake of the Samlaut uprising and the overseas activities of 
the Chinese cultural revolution. He fled to the bush in October 1967 after Sihanouk 
made him the target of increasingly threatening invective which included strong re­
marks at a September 1967 speech in Hu Nime' s  constituency while Hu Nim was on the 
stage listening. 
Hu Nim reemerged after Sihanouk's deposition as Information Minister in the 
Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea, a position he continues to hold from 
the new Assembly of the Representatives of the People of Kampuchea. Hu Nim repre­
sents Phnom Penh factory workers in that body. He is also a member of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 
Mrs. Hu Nim joined him in the bush and was among the ladies who greeted Monique 
during Sihanouk's 1973 visit to Cambodia. 
KHIVlER COMIVIUNIST GLOSSARY 
kan military unit 
• kan jhlap village guerrilla 
kan tar!)pat' n regional forces 
• • 
•
kan sruac regular forces 
kan dab padivatt Revolutionary Armed 
kambuja Forces of Kampuchea 
kamra.kar sahajib factory workerst' 
union 
kamnasiddhi ruam collective property 
k.amrm'phipal cadre; administrative 
conmittee 
_..
kasan to construct; to build 
kasikar kra poor and lower 
kasikar ka.Qtal middle peasant
thna'k krom 
kasilarr saha.karf'r · peasant cooperative 
framework; cadre 
( not current) . 
group 
krum sainaggi pa.nka solidarity group 
pangoen phal for :increasing 
production 
Gan: Pradnan ratth State Presidium 
'Ill .. .  
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Gan: qacintray nai 
sabha tarnn1In praj ajan.. .kambuja 
Gan: qadhibati• 
calana 
ja 't  tarpn 
'it>ft ffi �11) �Wj r!,! �., gna j� 
):�'>a' j ih• ja'n 
jamhar• 
j� e� mc�•s 
km> nan khluan dI b� 
khluan 
t1rn moel 
dassan mahaj an �au��r:mt� 
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of the task and self­
reliance 
to monitor ; to sur­
veil 
• mas s  view 
criticism and self­
criticism 
traits ; elements 
duty; responsibility ; 
domain 
Communist Party of 
Kampuchea 
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to nurture 
to cause to surge
upward ;  to expand
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Connnunist  Youth 
of Kampuchea 
overall ; the whole ; 
the higher interest 
to strive for 
spirit;  moral 
core ; nucleus 
to drink ; to eat 
Organization 
